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I. NELSON V. CONCRETE SUPPLY Co.
Prior to Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co.' South Carolina followed
the common-law rule that contributory negligence is a complete bar to
recovery for negligently inflicted injury unless, for example, the de-
fendant was reckless or had the last clear chance to avoid the cause of
the injury.2 Earlier attempts to change this rule by adopting a system
of comparative fault were not successful. In particular, the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court quashed, on procedural grounds, a court of appeals
opinion 3 that adopted comparative fault.4 Further, the supreme court
1. 303 S.C. 243, 399 S.E.2d 783 (1991).
2. F. PATRICK HUBBARD & ROBERT L. FELIX, THE SOUTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS
134-43 (1990); see McLean v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 81 S.C. 100, 112, 61 S.E. 900, 904
(1908) (noting explicitly that the doctrine of comparative negligence is not recognized in
South Carolina).
3. Langley v. Boyter, 284 S.C. 162, 325 S.E.2d 550 (Ct. App. 1984), quashed per
curiam, 286 S.C. 85, 332 S.E.2d 100 (1985).
4. Langley v. Boyter, 286 S.C. 85, 332 S.E.2d 100 (1985) (per curiam). In reversing
the court of appeals, the supreme court concluded that courts deciding the issue of
whether to adopt comparative fault "must await the permission of this Court before a
change. . . is brought about, unless the Legislature acts on the matter beforehand." Id.
at 87, 332 S.E.2d at 101.
The adoption of comparative negligence in South Carolina is similar to the initial
pattern followed in Illinois. An intermediate appellate court in Illinois adopted compara-
tive negligence in 1967, and the Illinois Supreme Court reversed on the ground that such
action should be taken, if at all, by the legislature. Maki v. Frelk, 239 N.E.2d 445 (Ill.
1992]
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previously had held that several statutory comparative negligence
schemes which addressed specific areas were unconstitutional on equal
protection grounds.5
In prospective dictum Nelson adopted comparative negligence as
the law of South Carolina. The court stated:
For all causes of action arising on or after July 1, 1991, a plaintiff
in a negligence action may recover damages if his or her negligence is
not greater than that of the defendant. The amount of the plaintiff's
recovery shall be reduced in proportion to the amount of his or her
negligence. If there is more than one defendant, the plaintiff's negli-
gence shall be compared to the combined negligence, of all
1968), reu'g 229 N.E.2d 284 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967). In 1981 the Illinois Supreme Court,
taking the step it had been unwilling to take in 1968, adopted comparative fault in re-
sponse to a stalemate in the legislature. Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886 (Ill. 1981). The
Illinois Legislature adopted a comparative fault scheme in 1986.
5. See Marley v. Kirby, 271 S.C. 122, 245 S.E.2d 604 (1978) (per curiam) (holding
that special statutory comparative negligence scheme which applied solely to motor vehi-
cle accidents violated the Equal Protection Clause); see also Wessinger v. Southern Ry.,
470 F. Supp. 930 (D.S.C. 1979) (relying on Marley to hold unconstitutional the special
statutory treatment of contributory fault for railroad crossing signals). South Carolina
already uses comparative approaches in limited situations. Section 58-17-3730 of the
South Carolina Code parallels the federal scheme for railroad workers and seaman
adopted in 1908, Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988), and pro-
vides that comparative fault applies in actions by railroad employees against their em-
ployers "while engaging in commerce within this state." S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-17-3730
(Law. Co-op. 1976). Under this statute the plaintiff is entitled to recovery, less the plain-
tiff's share of the fault. When the injury results from violation of a statute enacted to
protect the employee, then contributory negligence is not even a partial bar. The statu-
tory scheme also reduces the impact of assumption of risk. See id. § 58-17-3740. The
constitutionality of § 58-17-3730 has not been addressed.
South Carolina also uses a comparative scheme in the Tort Claims Act, S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 15-78-10 to -190 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990), which adopts a comparative ap-
proach for joint tortfeasor situations in which a governmental entity is involved. Section
15-78-100(c) provides: "In all actions brought pursuant to this chapter when an alleged
joint tortfeasor is named as.party defendant in addition to the governmental entity, the
trier of fact must return a special verdict specifying the proportion of monetary liability
of each defendant against whom liability is determined." Id. § 15-78-100(c).
Comparative fault also would be applicable in a South Carolina court if the accident
occurred on navigable waters. The liability rules in these cases would be based on admi-
ralty law, which utilizes comparative fault. See, e.g., United States v. Reliable Transfer
Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975) (holding that damages in ship collision cases are to be appor-
tioned on the basis of relative fault); Godfrey v. Little River Fishing Fleet, Inc., 302 S.C.
426, 428, 396 S.E.2d 828, 830 (1990) (citing United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421
U.S. 397 (1975); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953)) (stating that the
doctrine of comparative negligence applies in maritime tort cases).
6. In Nelson it was irrelevant whether the court applied the doctrine of compara-
tive negligence or contributory fault because the court found that the defendant was not
negligent as a matter of law. See 303 S.C. at 245 n.1, 399 S.E.2d at 784 n.1.
[Vol. 43
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defendants.'
The court adopted comparative negligence because it determined that
compared to common-law contributory negligence, "comparative negli-
gence is the more equitable doctrine."" The Nelson opinion is brief and
does not contain an analysis of the reasons for this conclusion. Instead,
it refers the reader to Langley v. Boyter9 "[f]or an exhaustive analyti-
cal discussion of the history and merits of comparative negligence."10
It is unclear whether the court elected to postpone the effective
date of comparative negligence to July 1, 1991, to provide an opportu-
nity for legislative action, for adjustments by the bench and bar, or for
a change in liability insurance arrangements.1 ' In any event, one bill
has since been introduced in the House of Representatives.12 In addi-
tion, various organizations have presented proposals for legislative con-
sideration.' 3 However, the legislature has not passed any comparative
fault legislation.
A. The Form of Comparative Fault Adopted by Nelson
The system of comparative fault adopted in Nelson is a form of
the modified approach to comparative fault. There are two types of
modified systems4: The equal-to-or-less-than system,' in which the
plaintiff recovers damages if the plaintiff's percentage of fault is equal
to or less than the defendant's; and the less-than system, in which the
plaintiff recovers damages if the plaintiff's percentage of fault is less
7. Id. at 245, 399 S.E.2d at 784 (footnote omitted) (citing Elder v. Orluck, 515
A.2d 517 (Pa. 1986)). In Elder the Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted Pennsylva-
nia's comparative fault statute to require a comparison of the plaintiff's negligence with
that of all the defendants combined. 515 A.2d at 524.
8. Nelson, 303 S.C. at 244, 399 S.E.2d at 784.
9. 284 S.C. 162, 325 S.E.2d 550 (Ct. App. 1984), quashed per curiam, 286 S.C. 85,
332 S.E.2d 100 (1985).
10. Nelson, 303 S.C. at 244, 399 S.E.2d at 784.
11. For a comprehensive discussion of the use of prospective changes in rules of
tort law, see ROBERT E. KEETON, VENTURING To Do JUSTICE- 25-53 (1969). The South
Carolina Supreme Court has used this approach in the past to make major changes in
tort doctrine. See, e.g., McCall v. Batson, 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741 (1985) (prospec-
tive abolition of sovereign immunity).
12. H.R. 3662, 109th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (S.C. 1991).
13. For example, the South Carolina Law Institute and the South Carolina Trial
Lawyers Association have informally prepared and submitted proposals.
14. See Langley v. Boyter, 284 S.C. 162, 187, 325 S.E.2d 550, 564 (Ct. App. 1984),
quashed per curiam, 286 S.C. 85, 332 S.E.2d 100 (1985); VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARA-
TIVE NEGLIGENCE § 3.1, at 46-47 (2d ed. 1986); see also UNIF. CoMP. FAULT ACT prefatory
note, 12 U.L.A. 41-42 (Supp. 1991) (criticizing the two modified forms).
15. The Nelson court adopted this system. See 303 S.C. at 245, 399 S.E.2d at 784.
1992]
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than the defendant's.'1
In addition to these modified systems, there are pure systems in
which the plaintiff recovers, less the plaintiff's share of fault, regardless
of the percentage of the plaintiff's fault.17 Another approach, the
slight-gross system, allows the plaintiff to recover damages, less the
plaintiff's share of fault, only if the plaintiff's fault is slight and the
defendant's fault is gross.'5
Most statutory comparative fault schemes in other states use a
form of the modified system.1  However, nearly all of the states with
judicially adopted comparative fault schemes use the pure system.20
Thus, the Nelson decision is unusual because it judicially adopted a
modified system.
Nelson gave no express rationale for selecting the equal-to-or-less-
than modified system of comparative fault. However, the Nelson court
referred to the court of appeals opinion 2 in Langley v. Boyter, 2 which
the supreme court previously had quashed on a procedural ground.
2
3
The court of appeals had adopted a modified system similar to that
adopted in Nelson.24 In Langley the court of appeals summarized the
reasons in favor of this system as follows:
We choose the not-greater-than version of the doctrine for essen-
tially two reasons. Unlike the pure version, it does not allow a plaintiff
to recover when he has been the most at fault in causing an accident.
But, unlike the not-as-great-as version, it does not allow a defendant
to escape all responsibility for an accident which he was equally at
fault in causing. Instead, the not-greater-than version of the doctrine
strikes the reasonable balance of providing that parties equally at
fault in causing an accident share equally in its cost.
In choosing this modified version of the doctrine over the pure
version, we are also influenced by the conservative approach taken by
our Supreme Court in abrogating doctrines of common law.25
16. The plaintiff's damage recovery is usually decreased by the percentage of the
plaintiff's fault. However, a partial reduction is not a necessary part of a modified sys-
tem. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Langley, 284 S.C. at 187, 325 S.E.2d at 564.
18. See, e.g., id. at 186, 325 S.E.2d at 564.
19. See Table 2. For a state-by-state analysis of comparative fault, see 17 AM. Jun.
2D Negligence §§ 1299-1751 (1989).
20. See Table 2.
21. See Nelson, 303 S.C. at 244, 399 S.E.2d at 784.
22. 284 S.C. 162, 325 S.E.2d 550 (Ct. App. 1984), quashed per curiam, 286 S.C. 85,
332 S.E.2d 100 (1985).
23. Langley v. Boyter, 286 S.C. 85, 332 S.E.2d 100 (1985) (per curiam). In Langley
the appellants had not been granted leave to argue against precedent.
24. See Langley, 284 S.C. at 189, 325 S.E.2d at 565.
25. Id. (citing Fitzer v. Greater Greenville S.C. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 277
S.C. 1, 282 S.E.2d 230 (1981); Brown v. Anderson County Hosp. Ass'n, 268 S.C. 479, 234
[Vol. 43
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A number of authorities have criticized the modified system as less
desirable than a pure system.2 Nonetheless, in order to lay a founda-
tion for later discussion of possible extensions of Nelson, it is impor-
tant to consider two limitations on the modified system that the Nel-
son and Langley courts chose.
First, the court's reasoning in Langley indicates that Langley is
limited to doctrinal areas in which the defendant's fault is the basis of
liability. The court's concern with allowing a plaintiff to recover "when
he has been the most at fault in causing an accident" 27 suggests that
the opinion applies only to cases in which both parties are at fault.
Given its enphasis on fault, it is doubtful that the Langley rationale
can be applied if the plaintiff's claim is not based on the fault of the
defendant.
One example of a nonfault-based claim is when the plaintiff's
claim is based on statutory strict products liability,28 in which a de-
fendant may be held liable regardless of whether the defendant was
negligent.29 Similarly, a plaintiff is not barred from recovery because of
the plaintiff's own negligence if that negligence is merely a failure to
discover the defect in the product or to guard against the possibility of
its existence.30 Thus, in some instances a plaintiff may recover when
more at fault than a strictly liable defendant. As a result, the rationale
of Langley would be inapplicable to strict products liability cases.
A second limitation of Nelson's modified system is that, assuming
S.E.2d 873 (1977)).
26. See, e.g., UNIF. CoMP. FAULT AcT prefatory note, 12 U.LA. 41-42 (Supp. 1991);
John W. Wade, A Uniform Comparative Fault Act-What Should It Provide?, 10 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 220, 224-25 (1977). The rationale of Langley does not seem to be used as
the basis for apportioning liability in a number of situations in South Carolina. Contri-
bution among joint tortfeasors is assessed on a pro rata basis, not on the basis of relative
shares of fault. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-38-10, -30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990). Thus, a de-
fendant who is 80% at fault can recover 50% of the judgment from a codefendant who is
only 20% at fault. The rationale of Langley also is contrary to the South Carolina ap-
proach to indemnity. Even a strictly liable defendant has no right of indemnity from a
reckless joint tortfeasor. Scott v. Fruehauf Corp., 302 S.C. 364, 396 S.E.2d 354 (1990).
Langley's rationale also is contrary to the statutory scheme of pure comparative fault
adopted for railroad workers. See supra note 5.
27. Langley, 284 S.C. at 189, 325 S.E.2d at 565.
28. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-73-10 to -30 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (liability of sellers of
defective products). Section 15-73-10 is a nearly verbatim enactment of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 402A, and § 15-73-30 incorporates the comments to § 402A as the
legislative intent of the enactment.
29. See id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 98, at 693 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
PROSSER & KEETON].
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n (1977).
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two schemes are identical in other respects, 31 a scheme based on a
modified approach is more favorable to defendants than a scheme
based on a pure approach. The effect of a modified system is to bar the
plaintiff from any recovery if the plaintiff's negligence exceeds the de-
fendant's. A modified system also partially bars a plaintiff's recovery'
even when the plaintiff's negligence does not exceed the defendant's. It
is arguable that such a heads-defendant-wins, tails-defendant-shares
approach to liability is an equitable improvement from the total bar of
contributory negligence. 32 However, it also can be argued that it would
be fairer and more efficient to allow a plaintiff to completely recover if
the plaintiff is less at fault than the defendant.33 In any event, no equi-
table improvement would occur in a number of situations. For exam-
ple, a plaintiff's position under the current doctrine would be signifi-
cantly worse if Nelson were extended to strict products liability. In
this doctrinal area, because of the concerns for other policies and con-
cepts of responsibility, contributory negligence is not ordinarily a de-
fense.34 Therefore, the favorable treatment of defendants under the
modified system may be a reason not to extend Nelson to products
liability cases. Similarly, the defense-favoring orientation of the modi-
fied system also might be important in determining whether reckless-
ness, last clear chance, and other exceptions to the total bar of contrib-
utory negligence should be treated comparatively under Nelson. 5
31. The assumption of identical content in other respects is important because sys-
tems of the same type can greatly differ from state to state. See Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5.
32. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 29, § 67, at 468-70.
33. South Carolina used this approach in a statutory comparative scheme for motor
vehicle injuries. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1-300 (Law. Co-op. 1976). The South Carolina Su-
preme Court struck down this statute as unconstitutional. Marley v. Kirby, 271 S.C. 122,
245 S.E.2d 604 (1978) (per curiam). The statute provided:
In any motor vehicle accident, contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in
any action by any person or legal representative to recover damages for negli-
gence resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if such contributory
negligence was equal to or less than the negligence which must be established
in order to recover from the party against whom recovery is sought.
SC. CODE ANN. § 15-1-300 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
For an argument that either an approach similar to the statute's or a pure approach
is fairer and more efficient than the total bar approach of Nelson in the context of prod-
uct design cases, see infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. It also should be noted
that the statute's approach arguably is more consistent with the more-at-fault basis that
underlies Nelson. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
34. See supra note 29 and accompanying text and infra notes 121-31 and accompa-
nying text.
35. For a discussion of whether defenses under these doctrines should be treated
comparatively under Nelson, see infra notes 42-81 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 43
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B. Questions Concerning Future Developments
The limitations of Nelson's modified system are important be-
cause a broader and more basic issue underlies the many specific ques-
tions about the future use of Nelson: Will Nelson be strictly limited to
the abolition of contributory negligence, or will the comparative ap-
proach be expanded to establish a comparative fault system in South
Carolina that is similar to those in other states?36
No clear answers exist to this broad question or to a number of
more specific questions concerning the implementation and possible
development of Nelson. This Article will address these questions. Al-
though authority from other states will be referred to throughout the
Article, comparative schemes in other states vary so substantially that
authority from other states provides limited guidance and requires
careful analysis. The states adopting comparative fault use a wide vari-
"ety of approaches to handle the complex and interrelated issues in-
volved in a comparative fault system.37 Moreover, the approach a state
uses may be affected by whether the state adopted the scheme legisla-
tively or judicially.38 Therefore, the states cannot be divided simply
into comparative fault states and contributory negligence states. Nor
can they be categorized as pure comparative fault states and modified
comparative fault states. A state that has a pure approach and a state
that has a modified approach may similarly treat the types of fault"
and harms40 included, and use similar approaches to counterclaims.41
These two states would be very similar to each other, but very different
36. Perhaps the best example of a broad comparative fault scheme is the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act. The Act uses a pure system of comparative fault and adopts the
following definition of fault:
"Fault" includes acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or
reckless toward the person or property of the actor or others, or that subject a
person to strict tort liability. The term also includes breach of warranty, unrea-
sonable assumption of risk not constituting an enforceable express consent,
misuse of a product for which the defendant otherwise would be liable, and
unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages.
UNIF. Cohip. FAULT ACT § 1(b), 12 U.LA 43 (Supp. 1991). Iowa and Washington have
adopted the Act. See UNri. Cohip. FAULT ACT table of jurisdictions, 12 U.L.A. 41 (Supp.
1991). Other states also use a broad definition of fault in their comparative systems. The
California Supreme Court, for example, has indicated that its judicially-adopted scheme
of'comparative fault is so broad that "the term 'equitable apportionment of loss' is more
accurately descriptive of the process." Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1172
(Cal. 1978).
37. See Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5.
38. See Table 1.
39. See Tables 2 and 5.
40. See infra notes 119, 144, 149 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 205-11 and accompanying text.
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from other pure or modified approaches.
II. EXCEPTIONS TO CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A TOTAL BAR TO
RECOVERY
Prior to Nelson exceptions existed to South Carolina's rule that
contributory negligence is a total bar to recovery. 42 Plaintiffs undoubt-
edly will argue that these exceptions are still applicable after Nelson
and that they are entitled to full recovery when an exception is shown.
Defendants will argue that the exceptions are a crude form of compar-
ative negligence and that these exceptions therefore should be explic-
itly and openly incorporated into the more precise comparative negli-
gence scheme of Nelson. The major exceptions are discussed separately
below.
A. Recklessness of Defendant
Currently, contributory negligence in South Carolina is not a de-
fense if the defendant's actions were reckless.' 3 If the plaintiff also was
reckless, however, that misconduct will completely bar the plaintiff's
recovery.4' It is unclear whether Nelson changed this rule.
Recklessness and negligence arguably should be compared because
both involve wrongdoing and are similar in nature.45 The current rule
concerning recklessness can be viewed as a crude form of comparative
fault.46 In addition, it arguably would be more equitable to allow the
plaintiff to recover when the plaintiff's contributory recklessness is less
than the recklessness of the defendant. Currently, the plaintiff's reck-
42. See HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 2, at 134-47.
43. Id. at 137.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Stockman v. Marlowe, 271 S.C. 334, 338, 247 S.E.2d 340, 342 (1978)
(per curiam) (interpreting negligence, as used in S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1-300 (Law. Co-op.
1976), to include recklessness). The Stockman court stated:
Although "recklessness", "willfulness", and "wantonness" Are, from a tech-
nical standpoint, distinct from "negligence", the concepts are inextricably con-
nected and interwoven to the extent that "negligence" in its broadest sense is
often said to encompass conduct of the former variety. The words "reckless-
ness", "willfulness", and "wantonness" are extensions of the law of negligence.
While we have no intention or desire to dispense with the often critical distinc-
tions between these terms, we feel that the legislature, in using the term "neg-
ligence" in § 15-1-300, intended to use that term in its broadest sense. It is our
conclusion that the legislature used the term ... so as to encompass the kin-
dred concepts of "recklessness", "willfulness" and "wantonness".
Id. (citation omitted). Section 15-1-300 was declared unconstitutional in Marley v.
Kirby, 271 S.C. 122, 245 S.E.2d 604 (1978) (per curiam). See supra note 5.
46. HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 2, at 137.
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lessness acts as a total bar to recovery regardless of the recklessness of
the defendant.47 Application of Nelson to recklessness would result in
only a partial bar to recovery for the plaintiff. Thus, the comparative
approach of Nelson arguably should replace the current treatment of
recklessness.
However, recklessness arguably is different from negligence in
kind as well as degree. 48 Under this view the current rule is based on a
causation analysis, not comparative fault. Under this causation analy-
sis the defendant's reckless conduct is the proximate cause of the in-
jury because it supersedes the negligence of the plaintiff.4 South Caro-
lina courts define recklessness as conduct that involves the actor's
conscious awareness that the act is negligent.50 This conscious aware-
ness distinguishes recklessness from negligence and supports the view
that reckless behavior supersedes negligence.51
Even if recklessness and negligence are so different that compari-
son is not possible, it might still be possible to use a separate system of
comparative recklessness. Under this approach the recklessness of the
defendant would be compared to the recklessness of the plaintiff.52
No consistent pattern exists concerning other states' treatment of
recklessness in a comparative fault scheme.53 In some states reckless-
ness is included on the basis of statute54 or case law.5  Some states
have refused, however, to extend the comparative approach to conduct
that is reckless, willful, or wanton. 6
B. Last Clear Chance
The current rule in South Carolina is that a contributorily negli-
47. See id.
48. See id. at 137 & n.23.
49. See id. at 115-17.
50. See id. at 42.
51. Cf. Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 242 S.E.2d 671 (1978) (holding that
the intervening conduct of the repairman, who deliberately chose an improper repair
method, was the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff's death, and the defendant there-
fore could not be held liable for negligent design).
52. See, e.g., Simonson v. White, 713 P.2d 983 (Mont. 1986) (reasoning that a com-
parison of the parties' reckless conduct was proper even though the comparative negli-
gence statute did not apply to reckless conduct).
53. See Table 3; SCHWARTZ, supra note 14, § 5.3; Thomas R. Trenkner, Annotation,
Modern Development of Comparative Negligence Doctrine Having Applicability to
Negligence Actions Generally, 78 A.L.R.3D 339, 389-92 (1977).
54. See Table 3 and notes; see also UNIF. Comp. FAULT AcT § 1(b), 12 U.L.A. 43
(Supp. 1991) (including recklessness in the definition of fault).
55. See Table 3 and notes.
56. Id.
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gent plaintiff is not barred from suit if the defendant had the last clear
chance to avoid the injury."' It is unclear whether Nelson changed this
rule.
The arguments concerning the last clear chance rule parallel the
arguments concerning the doctrine of recklessness. It is arguable that
the current last clear chance rule is simply a crude form of comparative
negligence.5 Therefore, in cases in which the defendant had the last
clear chance to avoid the injury, a plaintiff's negligence should be
treated comparatively under Nelson. The counterargument is that the
last clear chance rule is simply an application of the proximate cause
requirement.9 From this perspective th6 conduct of the defendant is
an intervening act that supersedes the contributory negligence of the
plaintiffl0; therefore, last clear chance cases should not be treated in a
comparative manner under Nelson.
Other jurisdictions provide only partial guidance on this question.
Most states include the last clear chance doctrine in their comparative
schemes. 61 However, some states retain last clear chance as a distinct
doctrine and allow a plaintiff full recovery if the defendant had the last
clear chance to avoid the cause of the injury.
62
57. HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 2, at 138-43.
58. See Jerry J. Phillips, The Case for Judicial Adoption of Comparative Fault in
South Carolina, 32 S.C. L. REv. 295, 297 (1980) (stating that the doctrine of last clear
chance is merely an intermediate step between contributory negligence and comparative
negligence); cf. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1240 (Cal. 1975) ("[W]hen true
comparative negligence is adopted, the need for last clear chance as a palliative of the
hardships of the 'all-or-nothing' rule disappears and its retention results only in a wind-
fall to the plaintiff in direct contravention of the [pure comparative] principle of liability
in proportion to fault."); HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 2, at 141-43 (discussing the use of
last clear chance to mitigate a plaintiff's contributory negligence); Fleming James, Jr.,
Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704 (1938) (reviewing the his-
torical application of last clear chance and stating that the law's failure to recognize last
clear chance as a device for comparing the parties' negligence forces juries to find for the
plaintiff on questions of fault).
59. See Smith v. Blackwell, 250 S.C. 170, 175, 156 S.E.2d 867, 870 (1967). However,
it can be argued that this proximate cause analysis is based on a policy of mitigating the
harsh effect that results from the total bar of contributory negligence. See HUBBARD &
FELIX, supra note 2, at 142-43. From this perspective the doctrine is no longer necessary
because Nelson has mitigated the harsh effect of the total bar.
60. Seay v. Southern Ry., 205 S.C. 162, 174-75, 31 S.E.2d 133, 138 (1944).
61. See Table 3; Trenkner, supra note 53, at 386-89. This approach is adopted by
the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. UNIF. CoMP. FAULT AcT § 1(a), 12 U.LA 43 (Supp.
1991).
62. See Table 3.
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C. Duties to Protect Foreseeably Negligent Victims
In a number of situations the law imposes a duty on one person to
use due care to protect a second person from that second person's own
negligence." For example, school teachers have a duty to use due care
to protect their students from the students' own foreseeable negli-
gence. 4 Because this duty exists, a court should not treat foreseeable
negligence of a child as a contributory bar to recovery.6 5 It is unclear,
however, whether Nelson applies to this and similar situations. The
following paragraphs will address some common situations to which
Nelson may apply.
1. Fiduciary Relationships
A broad range of situations involve fiduciary relationships. A fidu-
ciary relationship "'exists when one imposes a special confidence in
another, so that the latter, in equity and good conscience, is bound to
act in good faith and with due regard to the interests of the one impos-
ing the confidence.' "66 These relationships are so diverse that it is im-
possible to develop a general rule for the role of comparative negli-
gence. Largely because of this diversity, some courts have applied
comparative fault to the facts involved 7 and others, on different facts,
have not.68
2. Children
In light of Nelson it is important to consider doctrines that were
63. See HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 2, at 32-33, 46-49, 60-64, 68-72.
64. Cf. id. at 60-62 (discussing duties in custodial relationships).
65. Id. at 144; see also Bramlette v. Charter-Medical-Columbia, 302 S.C. 68, 74,
393 S.E.2d 914, 917 (1990) (citing Cowan v. Doering, 522 A.2d 444 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1987), aff'd, 545 A.2d 159 (N.J. 1988)) (finding that decedents contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk were not available defenses in a negligence suit against
defendants who owed a special duty to prevent reasonably foreseeable suicide).
66. Steele v. Victory Say. Bank, 295 S.C. 290, 293, 368 S.E.2d 91, 93 (Ct. App.
1988) (quoting Island Car Wash, Inc. v. Norris, 292 S.C. 595, 599, 358 S.E.2d 150, 152
(Ct. App. 1987)).
67. See, e.g., Capital Mortgage Corp. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 369 N.W.2d 922
(Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (per curiam) (applying comparative negligence to a suit against
accounting firm for its failure to detect embezzlement), appeal denied, 424 Mich. 899
(1986).
68. See, e.g., In re Atlantic Fin. Management, Inc., Sec. Litig., 603 F. Supp. 135,
137-38 (D. Mass. 1985) (mer.) (stating that comparative negligence should not be ap-
plied in securities fraud litigation or in cases involving a fiduciary relationship), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1072 (1987).
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developed to impose duties to protect children from their own negli-
gence. Two examples of such doctrines are the duty of custodians to
act affirmatively to protect children in their custody69 and the duty of
landowners to protect child trespassers from an attractive nuisance.70
Nelson does not eliminate these duties, but it does raise two questions.
The first question is whether the courts will compare the negligence of
a child to the negligence of a custodian or landowner. The second ques-
tion is whether the courts will bar a child's recovery if the child's negli-
gence exceeds the defendant's negligence. Any bar of recovery, particu-
larly a total bar, would appear to frustrate the policy of protecting
children that underlies the initial imposition of these duties.
3. Liquor Licensees and Patrons
Liquor licensees must use due care to ensure that they do not
serve alcohol to intoxicated patrons.71 A breach of this duty may result
in liability of the licensee for injury to a patron caused, for example, by
the patron's negligent driving.72 The legislative purpose behind this
duty arguably is to protect "intoxicated persons and the public by giv-
ing licensees, who benefit from the sale of liquor, an incentive to use
due care to protect their patrons from the lack of judgment that intoxi-
cation causes.
7 3
Under Nelson will the patron be totally or partially barred from
recovery? Intoxicated patrons arguably have some responsibility for
their condition and are therefore entitled to less protection than, for
example, a child. Thus, a partial bar has some intuitive appeal on fair- -
ness grounds. On the other hand, the possibility of a partial or total
bar may reduce incentives for liquor licensees to avoid serving alcohol
to intoxicated patrons. Consequently, applying comparative analysis in
this situation could be contrary to the policy that underlies the imposi-
tion of liability on the liquor licensee.
4. Foreseeable Misuse of Products
Product manufacturers have a duty to design products with rea-
sonable safety features that prevent injury from foreseeable misuse.
For example, an automobile manufacturer has a duty to build crash-
69. See HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 2, at 60-61.
70. See id. at 80-81.
71. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-9-410(2) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
72. See Christiansen v. Campbell, 285 S.C. 164, 328 S.E.2d 351 (Ct. App. 1985);
HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 2, at 68-70.
73. See Christiansen, 285 S.C. at 168, 328 S.E.2d at 354.
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worthy vehicles. 7 4 Courts also have found that products used in the
workplace must be designed with safety devices to protect workers
from foreseeable conduct, including foreseeable negligent conduct.75
Thus, a manufacturer apparently cannot assert contributory negligence
as a defense in a suit for negligent design when that contributory negli-
gence was foreseeable and should have been addressed in the design.76
It is unclear whether Nelson will alter this approach.
There are some policy arguments that favor and some that disfa-
vor the application of Nelson to foreseeable misuse. The comparative
approach arguably is a fairer and more efficient method because it
makes both wrongdoers responsible and provides both parties with a
greater incentive to use due care.7 However, because Nelson adopted a
modified system rather than a pure system, both the fairness and effi-
ciency arguments are questionable in cases in which the plaintiff's neg-
ligence exceeds that of the defendant and the plaintiff therefore is to-
tally barred from recovery. In this fact situation a manufacturer would
have little incentive to design safety features to protect users from
foreseeable misuse. Thus, in cases in which a defendant manufacturer
has made a conscious design choice, the Nelson total bar to recovery is
even more questionable."
Authority from other jurisdictions does not provide clear guidance
on the protection of foreseeably negligent victims.7 1 The problem re-
sults in part from the variety of comparative schemes used in other
states. It is important to consider whether the particular comparative
fault scheme has a broad definition of fault that includes not only neg-
ligence but also strict tort, warranty, and assumption of risk. Addition-
ally, one must consider whether the jurisdiction has adopted a pure or
74. See, e.g., Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 228-34, 166 S.E.2d 173, 184-87
(1969).
75. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Custom Ice Equip. Co., 271 S.C. 171, 246 S.E.2d 176
(1978).
76. This section addresses only actions in negligence. For a discussion of strict tort
or warranty actions, see infra notes 121-39 and accompanying text.
77. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 14, § 12.5, at 205; cf. Daly v. General Motors Corp.,
575 P.2d 1162, 1169 (Cal. 1978) (concluding that application of'a pure system of compar-
ative fault to strict liability will not reduce manufacturer incentives to provide safe
products).
78. A conscious design choice is involved if a manufacturer's decision to utilize a
safety feature is based on an explicit comparison of the relative costs of adopting the
feature (safety costs) with the costs of not adopting the feature (accident costs). See
Claytor v. General Motors Corp., 277 S.C. 259, 265, 286 S.E.2d 129, 132 (1982). If a
manufacturer is not liable for the accident costs, and the costs of a safety feature that
would prevent the accident exceed the accident costs, a profit-maximizing manufacturer
will not adopt the safety feature even though the safety feature costs less than the acci-
dents it could prevent. See GUIDO CALABREsI, THE COSTS OF AccmENTS 73-74 (1970).
79. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 14, §§ 12.2-.5.
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a modified system because a pure system arguably is fairer and more
efficient, particularly in the context of product design.80 A related
problem in the use of authority from other jurisdictions arises because
the theory of recovery and the nature of the product misuse can vary
from case to case. Thus, a careful analysis of the authority requires a
concern for two distinctions. First, one must distinguish among negli-
gence, strict liability in tort, and warranty as possible bases of recovery
for a product defect. Second, one must distinguish between unreasona-
ble misuse that involves only contributory negligence and unreasonable
misuse that involves assumption of risk.81 Because of the need to make
such distinctions, it is difficult to find cases from other jurisdictions
that give consistent guidance for specific applications of comparative
negligence in all of the possible foreseeable-misuse situations.
III. DEFENSES SIMILAR TO CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Contributory negligence is not the only conduct by the plaintiff
that will bar recovery under current law. The plaintiff also is barred if
the plaintiff assumes a risk82 or the injury resulted from the plaintiff's
unreasonable failure to prevent avoidable consequences83 It is not
clear whether Nelson will be applied to these doctrines and permit the
plaintiff to recover in certain circumstances.
A. Assumption of Risk
Under the doctrine of assumption of risk, a plaintiff is totally
barred from recovery if the plaintiff voluntarily encounters a risk with
an appreciation of both the nature and extent of the risk." Most states
other than South Carolina have either abolished the doctrine of as-
sumption of risk or included it in the state's comparative fault
scheme.85
80. See CALABRESI, supra note 78, at 70.
81. Unreasonable misuse that involves assumption of risk is generally a defense to
strict liability in tort. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15.73-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976). Ordinary contribu-
tory negligence, however, is not a defense. See id. § 15-73-30. Section 15-73-30 incorpo-
rates the comments to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A as the legislative intent of
the statute. Id. Comment n to § 402A states that ordinary contributory negligence is not
a defense in strict liability cases. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A cmt. n (1977).
82. See generally HUBBARD & FELx, supra note 2, at 147-50 (discussing South Car-
olina's current rule).
83. See generally id. at 136 (distinguishing avoidable consequences from contribu-
tory negligence).
84. Id. at 148.
85. See Table 3; Annotation, Effect of Adoption of Comparative Negligence Rules
on Assumption of Risk, 16 A.L.R.4TH 700 (1982).
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1. Retention of the Doctrine as a Total Bar to Recovery
Defendants are likely to argue that South Carolina should reject
the pattern of other states and continue to recognize assumption of
risk as a complete bar to recovery. Because Nelson refers to negligence
rather than fault, the literal wording of the opinion arguably indicates
that assumption of risk is not affected. Moreover, defendants could ar-
gue that because negligence and assumption of risk are two distinct
concepts, comparing the two would be logically incoherent.8s Conse-
quently, the term "negligence" should not be interpreted to include
assumption of risk.
This argument relies on the traditional conceptual analysis that
"'assumption of risk rests in contract or in the principle expressed by
the ancient maxim, "volenti non fit injuria," whereas contributory
negligence rests in tort.' "8s7 Thus, because a plaintiff who knowingly
and voluntarily encounters a risk consents to the risk in a contractual
sense,8 8 the tort doctrine of comparative negligence arguably is not
applicable.
2. Rejection of the Doctrine as a Total Bar to Recovery
Virtually all states have rejected these arguments and have abol-
ished assumption of risk as a total bar to recovery in tort.89 Two rea-
sons exist for this rejection. First, unreasonable assumption of risk is
simply a form of contributory negligence and should be treated as
such.90 Second, reasonable assumption of risk does not involve fault
and should not bar the plaintiff's recovery unless it constitutes an ex-
press contractual agreement to bear the risk of the defendant's
negligence.9 1
86. Cf. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1167 (Cal. 1978) (noting that
comparing strict liability to negligence has been analogized to comparing "apples and
oranges," but ultimately finding that the two can be blended and accommodated).
87. Daniel v. Tower Trucking Co., 205 S.C. 333, 348, 32 S.E.2d 5, 9 (1944) (per
curiam) (quoting 38 AM. JuR. Negligence § 172 (1941)).
88. See Griffin v. Griffin, 282 S.C. 288, 294, 318 S.E.2d 24, 28 (Ct. App. 1984)
(quoting 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 174(1) (1966)).
89. See Table 3.
90. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 14, § 9.1.
91. See id. § 9.2; Annotation, Effect of Comparative Negligence Rules on Assump-
tion of Risk, 16 A.L.R.4TH 700 (1982).
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a. Unreasonable Assumption of Risk-Inclusion Within a
Comparative Scheme
South Carolina recognizes that assumption of risk and contribu-
tory negligence overlap. Although cases often stress the conceptual dif-
ferences between contributory negligence and assumption of risk, it
also has been recognized that the differences are a matter of degree
rather than kind. It also has been recognized that situations exist in
which assumption of risk and contributory negligence overlap and can
be considered as the same.92 More specifically, assumption of risk over-
laps with contributory negligence in those situations in which the
plaintiff assumes a risk that is unreasonable.93 In such a case the con-
duct is at least negligent,9 and any differences between contributory
negligence and assumption of risk are a matter of degree rather than
kind. Given this overlap, assumption of risk is redundant and unneces-
sary as a separate defense. Because unreasonable assumption of a risk
constitutes negligence, it falls within the literal wording of Nelson and
should be included in the comparative negligence assessment.95
It may be necessary to distinguish conscious or subjective contrib-
utory negligence from unconscious or objective contributory negli-
gence.98 For example, a judge may charge the jury to consider the con-
sciousness of the plaintiffs action in determining the comparative
share of negligence.9 7 However, this terminology is regarded as more
helpful than the term "assumption of risk." 98
92. See, e.g., Stogner v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 184 S.C. 406, 411, 192 S.E. 406,
408 (1937); Collins & Sons Fine Jewelry, Inc. v. Carolina Safety Sys., Inc., 296 S.C. 219,
234, 371 S.E.2d 539, 548 (Ct. App. 1988). Stogner addressed the overlap as follows:
It has frequently been stated, and with good reason, that assumption of
risk and contributory negligence are so closely allied that it is sometimes diffi-
cult to draw the true line of distinction. [I]n a broad sense assumption of risk
shades into contributory negligence, the difference being one of degree rather
than kind. It is also generally declared that the point where the two concepts
approximate is where the danger is so obvious and imminent that no one of
ordinary prudence would encounter it.
184 S.C. at 411, 192 S.E. at 408 (citations omitted).
93. See HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 2, at 150-51.
94. See id. If a plaintiff knowingly assumes a risk, it is arguable that the plaintiff
also may have been reckless because the plaintiff consciously engaged in the negligent
conduct. See infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
95. See Collins & Sons Fine Jewelry, Inc. v. Carolina Safety Sys., Inc., 296 S.C. 219,
234, 371 S.E.2d 539, 548 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing Dilorio v. Tipaldi, 357 N.E.2d 319 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1976)) ("Where the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk
overlap, the trial court may properly limit its instructions to contributory negligence.").
96. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 29, § 68, at 495.
97. See infra text accompanying note 237.
98. See, e.g., McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co., 196 A.2d 238, 240-41 (N.J. 1963)
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b. Reasonable Assumption of Risk
With reasonable assumption of risk there is no fault and no over-
lap with contributory negligence. The fundamental question then is
whether a rationale exists for barring any recovery when there is no
fault. The bar of recovery makes sense when an express contractual
agreement governs the issue of who will bear the risk."" If no express
consent exists, a bar to recovery can be defended only by reference to
an implied consent. However, to imply consent, one must rely on ques-
tionable assumptions about consent.
If implied-in-fact consent is the basis of the bar, the defendant
should be required to prove that the victim intended to absolve the
defendant from liability for negligence.100 In effect, the defendant
would argue that the facts support an inference of an express consent.
Given the requirements that apply when an express consent is al-
leged,10 1 it will be difficult for the defendant to show that an express
assumption of risk can be inferred. Nevertheless, only this type of fac-
tual showing would satisfy a bar to recovery that is based on implied-
in-fact consent. In the rare instance when the showing is made, the
rules applicable to express consent would apply, and the plaintiff
would not be entitled to any recovery.
A fictional implied-in-law consent also is a questionable basis for
the bar. There have been many situations in which the courts have
held that a plaintiff who voluntarily encountered a known risk is not
barred from recovery. 101 These holdings are understandable because
life constantly involves voluntary encounters with known reasonable
risks. For example, because it is known that some motorists will not
stop at stop signs, all motorists knowingly encounter that risk when
they choose to drive. Yet, a motorist struck by a car that does not stop
at a stop sign is not barred from recovery on the ground that the mo-
(per curiam) ("Experience ... indicates the term 'assumption of risk' is so apt to create
mist that it is better banished from the scene. We hope we have heard the last of it.
Henceforth let us stay with 'negligence' and 'contributory negligence.' ").
99. See infra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
100. Cf. Daniel v. Tower Trucking Co., 205 S.C. 333, 347-49, 32 S.E.2d 5, 8-9 (1944)
(per curiam) (holding that a passenger in an automobile does not ordinarily assume the
risk of a driver's negligence even if it is foreseeable that the driver will act negligently);
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 496C(1) (1977) (stating that assumption of risk ap-
plies to a plaintiff only "under circumstances that manifest his willingness to accept it");
id. § 496E(2)(b) (stating that acceptance of risk is not voluntary if the plaintiff is exercis-
ing or protecting a right).
101. See HUBBARD & FELix, supra note 2, at 149-50.
102. See, e.g., Daniel v. Tower Trucking Co., 205 S.C. 333, 32 S.E.2d 5 (1944) (per
curiam) (holding that a guest passenger who knows that a driver is likely to drive reck-
lessly does not assume the risk).
1992]
19
Hubbard and Felix: Comparative Negligence in South Carolina: Implementing Nelson v.
Published by Scholar Commons, 1992
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
torist assumed that foreseeable risk. Thus, implied-in-law consent can-
not provide the basis for the bar to recovery because no scheme exists
for identifying which of life's risks will be viewed as involving an as-
sumption of a reasonable risk. Therefore, a plaintiff who acts reasona-
bly should not be denied recovery simply because that plaintiff volun-
tarily encountered a known risk. Consequently, many states have
abolished the defense of reasonable assumption of risk.103
3. Express Assumption of Risk-A Total Bar to Recovery
An express consent to assume a risk for negligence differs from
other types of assumption of risk.1'0 Under common-law principles en-
forceable express agreements are a total bar to recovery for negli-
gence. 0 5 They remain a total bar under comparative negligence
schemes. 108 The basis for this treatment under comparative negligence
schemes is that an express assumption of risk does not constitute fault.
Instead, an express contractual agreement shifts the risk of negligence
to the plaintiff and releases the defendant from any duty of care. 07
4. Assumption of Risk, Recklessness, and Duty
The analysis of assumption of risk overlaps with two other topics.
First, when unreasonable assumption of risk is involved, the conduct
also might involve recklessness. The possibility of overlap depends on
the facts; assumption of risk does not necessarily involve recklessness.
The former requires conscious awareness of the risk, while recklessness
involves a conscious awareness of not only the risk but also the unrea-
sonable nature of the risk. 08 Thus, depending on the facts, the analysis
of a plaintiff's recklessness under Nelson also might be relevant. 08
Second, the analysis of the defendant's duty often will overlap
with the concerns underlying assumption of risk. For example, an
owner or occupier of real property does not owe licensees a duty of due
care for conditions that the licensee may reasonably be expected to
discover." 0 The emphasis here is on things likely to be known to the
103. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 29, § 68, at 493-94.
104. See, e.g., UNri. Comp. FAuLT AcT § 1(b) cmt., 12 U.LA. 43 (Supp. 1991) (com-
paring an implied unreasonable assumption of risk to an express consent).
105. HUBBARD & FELIx, supra note 2, at 149-50.
106. See e.g., Arbegast v. Board of Educ., 480 N.E.2d 365 (N.Y. 1985); UNIF. COMP.
FAULT AcT § 1(b) cmt., 12 U.LA 43 (Supp. 1991).
107. See HUBBARD & FELix, supra note 2, at 149-50.
108. See id. at 42-43.
109. See supra notes 43-56 and accompanying text.
110. HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 2, at 76-78.
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victim. In this respect the emphasis is similar to assumption of risk.
However, this concern with the knowledge of the victim is based on
objective foreseeability from the perspective of the owner or occupier,
not on what the particular licensee in fact knew. If objective knowledge
exists, there is no duty.
The net result, with both assumption of risk and recklessness, is
that the defendant is not liable. Although the result may be the same,
the distinction is conceptually important because if no duty or no
breach of duty exists, the comparative approach of Nelson is clearly
inapplicable.
B. Harm from Avoidable Consequences or Failure to Mitigate
Harm
. The total bar to recovery for contributory negligence applies only
to those injuries that are proximately caused by the victim's negli-
gence."' Thus, a victim's negligence in failing to seek medical care af-
ter an automobile collision would not bar recovery for injury to the
victim's automobile. There is simply no causal connection. However,
recovery for some of the bodily injury resulting from the collision
might be barred by the subsequent negligent failure to seek medical
assistance. This legal effect is often referred to as the doctrine of avoid-
able consequences. This doctrine bars recovery for losses caused by the
plaintiff's contributory negligence when the losses occur after the ini-
tial injury, as in the example of negligent failure to get proper medical
treatment."2 Under the common law, recovery for the incremental
harm resulting from the plaintiff's negligent conduct is totally barred,
but the initial injuries are recoverable. Thus, the avoidable conse-
quences doctrine is, in effect, a form of contributory negligence."'
The phrase "avoidable consequences" is helpful because it assists
111. Id. at 134.
112. See Ostrowski v. Azzara, 545 A.2d 148, 151 (N.J. 1988) (noting that the doc-
trine also has roots in the law of damages and is applicable in both tort and contract);
HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 2, at 136-37, 471-72; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 29,
§ 65, at 458-59.
A helpful review of authorities can be found in Jerry J. Phillips, The Case for Adop-
tion of Comparative Fault in South Carolina, 32 S.C. L. REv. 295, 309-15 (1980). How-
ever, the author erroneously views avoidable consequences as a comparative fault doc-
trine. This view is erroneous because the doctrine is based on causation concepts and
because, under the doctrine, the plaintiff is totally barred from recovery for damages
proximately caused by the plaintiff's negligent failure to avoid the harmful consequences.
113. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 29, § 65, at 459 ("[T]he doctrines of con-
tributory negligence and avoidable consequences are in reality the same, and .. . the
distinction which exists is rather one between damages which are capable of assignment
to separate causes, and damages which are not.").
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in distinguishing two types of injuries: Subsequent avoidable injuries
proximately caused by the plaintiff's conduct and therefore barred in
whole or in part, and injuries not proximately caused by the plaintiff's
conduct and therefore not barred at all. Because of their usefulness in
making this distinction, the phrase "avoidable consequences" and the
underlying doctrinal distinction should be retained.
Under Nelson the plaintiff's negligent failure to avoid conse-
quences should be compared with the defendant's conduct that also
caused the avoidable consequences.114 A plaintiff should be allowed to
recover the defendant's share of the avoidable consequences if the de-
fendant's negligence was greater than the plaintiff's. This result is ap-
propriate because the avoidable consequences doctrine is simply a use-
ful way of referring to one type of harm from contributory negligence.
Currently, injuries from the failure to use a seat belt are not
barred in South Carolina under the doctrine of avoidable conse-
quences. A South Carolina statute provides that this failure is not con-
tributory negligence."" It could be argued that because Nelson abol-
ished contributory negligence, the statute is no longer applicable and
failure to wear a seat belt should be considered under the comparative
negligence scheme.'16 Under this argument the statutory concern with
114. This approach has been adopted in other jurisdictions. See UNW. CoMP. FAULT
ACT § 1(b) (defining fault); Wemyss v. Coleman, 729 S.W.2d 174 (Ky. 1987) (adopting
Uniform Act); Lowe v. Estate Motors, Ltd., 410 N.W.2d 706 (Mich. 1987) (including the
failure to use a seat belt in the comparative assessment); Love v. Park Lane Medical
Ctr., 737 S.W.2d 720 (Mo. 1987) (en banc) (adopting Uniform Act); Ostrowski v. Azzara,
545 A.2d 148 (N.J. 1988) (including posttreatment conduct of the patient in the compar-
ative assessment in a medical malpractice action). Florida appears to have adopted a
different view. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. f984)
(rejecting comparative treatment of seat belt injuries and reducing total comparative
negligence award by percentage of damages caused by the failure to wear a seat belt).
Arguably, avoidable consequences could simply be treated as a rule of damages that
bars recovery for a plaintiff's failure to mitigate damages. If postaccident conduct of the
plaintiff is involved, it also could be argued that the avoidable consequences doctrine is
based on proximate cause concepts and functions as a defendant's equivalent of the last
clear chance doctrine. However, there does not seem to be explicit authority for using
either approach to determine whether comparative negligence will apply to avoidable
consequences. At least one court appears to have rejected these approaches. Cf. Ostrow-
ski v. Azzara, 545 A.2d 148 (N.J. 1988) (considering damages and proximate cause views,
but applying comparative fault).
115. Section 56-5-6540(c) provides that a violation of the statutory duty to wear a
seat belt "does not constitute negligence per se or contributory negligence." S.C. CODE
ANN. § 56-5-6540(c) (Law. Co-op. 1991). Prior to the adoption of this act, the South
Carolina Supreme Court held in Keaton v. Pearson, 292 S.C. 579, 358 S.E.2d 141 (1987),
that, absent legislation imposing a duty to wear a seat belt, failure to wear a seat belt
does not constitute contributory negligence.
116. Cf. Law v. Superior Court, 755 P.2d 1135 (Ariz. 1988) (stating that prior au-
thority barred a seat belt defense, but noting that under comparative negligence the
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preserving recovery for plaintiffs is satisfied by the partial recovery al-
lowed under Nelson. The counterargument is that the legislative intent
is to exclude evidence of the failure to use a seat belt from tort litiga-
tion. Given this intent, failure to use a seat belt should be irrelevant
under Nelson as well." 7
IV. CAUSES OF ACTION TO WHICH THE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
DOCTRINE MAY APPLY
Nelson indicates that comparative negligence will apply to "a
plaintiff in a negligence action." n Before discussing specific claims
that might be governed by Nelson, it is helpful to consider two types of
general questions raised by the court's phrase.
First, which suits will be regarded as negligence actions? Some
suits might be excluded from the Nelson scheme because the tort at
issue does not involve negligence. The reference to negligence actions
also may indicate a limitation based on the nature of the harm in-
volved. For example, some comparative fault schemes are limited to
cases involving personal injury or property damage. 19 This limitation
is based on the view that purely economic harm should be addressed
by a doctrinal theory like contract rather than tort.
Second, if a particular claim does not clearly constitute a negli-
gence action, will the comparative approach be extended beyond negli-
gence to include actions7 not based on negligence? One possible exam-
ple of such an extension would be the adoption of a comparative fault
approach in situations in which a defendant is liable even if the de-
fendant was not negligent, as in a products liability suit based on strict
liability in tort. It is not clear whether such an extension to nonfault
failure to use a seat belt is a factor in assessing damages); Wemyss v. Coleman, 729
S.W.2d 174 (Ky. 1987) (adopting the Uniform Act and applying it to the failure to wear a
seat belt); Lowe v. Estate Motors, Ltd., 410 N.W.2d 706 (Mich. 1987) (stating that prior
authority barred a seat belt defense, but noting that under comparative negligence the
failure to use a seat belt is a factor in assessing damages); see generally Thomas R.
Trenkner, Annotation, Nonuse of Automobile Seat Belts as Evidence of Comparative
Negligence, 95 A.L.R.3D 239 (1979) (collecting comparative negligence cases in which
courts have addressed the issue of failure to use a seat belt).
117. Cf. Swajian v. General Motors Corp., 559 A.2d 1041 (R.I. 1989) (finding no
common-law or statutory duty to wear a seat belt and reasoning that the plaintiff's fail-
ure to use a seat belt was therefore irrelevant to a comparative fault assessment); Accu-
log, Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P.2d 728 (Utah 1984) (finding that the plaintiff's failure to keep
a fire extinguisher in its van was irrelevant to the liability of the defendant whose negli-
gence in servicing the van caused the fire).
118. Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 303 S.C. 243, 245, 399 S.E.2d 783, 784 (1991).
119. See UNIF. Comp. FAULT AcT § 1 cmt., 12 U.LA. 43 (Supp. 1991); ScHwARTZ,
supra note 14, § 2.2, at 36.
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doctrines is likely in the near future.
A. Intentional Torts
It is doubtful that the comparative approach will be extended to
intentional torts. The underlying basis for claims of intentional torts is
so different from that of negligence actions that virtually no state ex-
tends the comparative fault approach to intentional torts.120
B. Strict Liability in Tort
1. Statutory Schemes of Strict Liability
South Carolina has several statutory schemes that impose strict
liability. The most important of these schemes is strict liability in tort
for product defects.12' Although some states have included strict prod-
ucts liability in their comparative schemes, 2 it is not likely that South
Carolina will do so.
Liability under the South Carolina products liability statute is not
based on negligence. 123 Therefore, because Nelson applies to a plaintiff
in a negligence action, good reason exists to conclude that Nelson does
not apply to strict liability for product defects. Thus, in strict liability
tort actions for injuries that occur after July 1, 1991, the current rule,
which provides that contributory negligence is not a defense but as-
sumption of risk is a defense,'224 likely will remain in effect.
Moreover, even if Nelson is judicially expanded from a compara-
tive negligence scheme to a comparative fault scheme, 25 it is unlikely
that the courts would change the current rule that governs defenses for
strict products liability. Because strict liability for products is a statu-
120. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 14, § 5.2.
121. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-73-10 to -30 (Law. Co-op. 1976); see id. § 15-73-30
(adopting § 402A of the Restatement (Second) as the legislative intent); see generally
HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 2, at 216-22 (discussing South Carolina's strict tort
statute).
122. See Table 5; Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Applicability of Comparative
Negligence Doctrine to Actions Based on Strict Liability in Tort, 9 A.L.R.4TH 633
(1981).
123. See Barnwell v. Barber-Colman Co., 301 S.C. 534, 536, 393 S.E.2d 162, 163
(1989) (per curiam).
124. See HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 2, at 253. Section 15-73-30 incorporates the
comments to § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as the legislative intent. S.C.
CODE ANN. § 15-73-30 (Law. Co-op. 1976). Comment n to § 402A imposes liability for
assumption of risk, including unreasonable assumption of risk, but not for unknowing
contributory negligence. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n (1977).
125. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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tory scheme,126 the courts are likely to be hesitant to alter the scheme
by imposing a new and judicially-developed approach to defenses
within this scheme. This deference to the legislative scheme is particu-
larly important because the Nelson court adopted a modified approach
to comparative fault. Under this modified system a plaintiff is partially
barred if the plaintiff was equally or less negligent than the defendant
and totally barred if the plaintiff was more negligent. Thus, if Nelson
were applied to strict products liability, the resulting change in the
statutory scheme would be unfavorable to plaintiffs in some fact
situations.
If Nelson is applied to strict products liability, the extension
would have to be complete if it is to be fair. 2 ' Thus, assumption of
risk, as well as contributory negligence, should be treated in a compar-
ative manner, unless the assumption involved an enforceable express
consent to bear the risk.
The impact of Nelson on the Uniform State Law for Aeronau-
tics, 2" another statutory strict liability scheme, is unclear. This section
imposes strict liability on owners of aircraft for the following:
[I]njuries to persons or property on the land or water beneath caused
by ascent, descent or flight of the aircraft or the dropping or falling of
any object therefrom, whether such owner was negligent or not, unless
the injury is caused in whole or in part by the negligence of the person
injured or of the owner or bailee of the property injured.12
9
Because Nelson refers to negligence actions, it probably is not applica-
ble to actions under this statute. Thus, contributory negligence would
remain a total bar to recovery. If Nelson is expanded to a comparative
fault approach, however, comparative fault might apply to this statute.
Arguably, this application would involve improper judicial interference
with a legislative scheme. However, contributory negligence is already
a defense to an action under this statute, and extending Nelson to a
case brought under the statute would involve less change than an ex-
tension to cases based on statutory strict products liability.
Section 47-3-110 of the South Carolina Code imposes strict liabil-
ity on dog owners for dog bites or attacks unless the victim provoked
the dog.13 0 As indicated in the discussion of the statutory products lia-
bility scheme, Nelson arguably is not applicable to strict liability statu-
126. Prior to the adoption of the statute, the South Carolina courts had not recog-
nized strict products liability at common law. See, e.g., Hatfield v. Atlas Enters., 274 S.C.
247, 262 S.E.2d 900 (1980).
127. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
128. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 55-3-10 to -120 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
129. Id. § 55-3-60.
130. See id. § 47-3-110.
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tory schemes. However, because common-law strict liability for dog
bites was recognized prior to the adoption of the statute,131 more room
arguably exists for judicial extension of comparative fault in this
context.
2. Common-Law Schemes of Strict Liability
When common-law schemes of strict liability are involved,"'3
courts will have greater flexibility in adopting a comparative fault ap-
proach. The application of Nelson in these areas would, however, re-
quire some sort of an extension beyond a narrow, literal definition of a
negligence action.
Currently, the general rule of defenses based on plaintifrs conduct
in common-law strict liability actions is that assumption of risk is a
defense, but contributory negligence is not a defense unless it consti-
tutes knowing contributory negligence. 133 If Nelson were extended to
this area, the preceding analysis of assumption of risk and of statutory
strict products liability134 would be relevant.
C. Action for Injury as a Result of Breach of Warranty
Currently, contributory negligence and assumption of risk are
often treated as defenses to an action for breach of warranty." 5 The
basis for this treatment is that the plaintiff cannot recover if the plain-
tiff's own misuse or abuse proximately caused the injury."'
Because warranty actions are not based on negligence and claims
under the Uniform Commercial Code involve a legislative scheme, the
analysis here parallels the analysis of statutory strict liability in tort
131. See Hossenlopp v. Cannon, 285 S.C. 367, 329 S.E.2d 438 (1985) (adopting strict
liability for dog bites); HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 2, at 190-91. Note that strict prod-
ucts liability did not exist prior to the statutory enactment. See Hatfield v. Atlas Enters.,
Inc., 274 S.C. 247, 262 S.E.2d 900 (1980).
132. Common-law strict liability schemes include those activities that are inherently
dangerous such as dynamite blasting and keeping wild animals. See HUBBARD & FELIX,
supra note 2, at 188-91.
133. Id. at 192-93.
134. Statutory strict products liability and common-law strict liability have a simi-
lar approach to defenses that are based on a plaintiff's conduct. See supra note 124 and
accompanying text.
135. See HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 2, at 254-58. However, the application of
contributpry negligence is limited. See id. at 254-55.
136. See id. at 254-58; cf. Imperial Die Casting Co. v. Covil Insulation Co., 264 S.C.
604, 610, 216 S.E.2d 532, 534 (1975) (finding that contributory negligence is not a bar to
a plaintiff's recovery in a breach of warranty action, but noting that evidence could be
introduced to prove that the plaintiff's acts were the proximate cause of the injury).
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for a product defect. An important difference exists, however, because
the Uniform Commercial Code does not explicitly address plaintiff
misconduct as a defense. Instead, the analysis is conceptualized in
terms of proximate cause.137 This difference may indicate that Nelson
is inapplicable because Nelson addresses the defense of contributory
negligence and does not focus on the question of proximate cause.
However, it can be argued that contributory negligence also is based on
concepts of proximate cause because contributory negligence does not
bar recovery unless the plaintiff's acts proximately caused the injury
involved.' 38 From this perspective, there is less difficulty in applying a
Nelson approach to a UCC warranty claim than to a statutory strict
products liability claim. The UCC situation would not involve an inter-
ference with explicit statutory treatment of a plaintiff's conduct like
the treatment involved in statutory strict products liability.
When common-law warranties are involved, the analysis parallels
to some extent the analysis of common-law strict liability doctrines.
However, important differences arise in those situations that involve a
warranty like the warranty of workmanship, which is phrased in terms
of reasonable craftsmanship."' When a warranty of workmanship is in-
volved, comparative negligence is more likely to be applicable.
D. Misrepresentation
1. Fraud
Because fraud is not a negligence action, Nelson would not apply
unless the comparative approach is expanded beyond negligence. This
expansion is unlikely for two reasons. First, although there is not much
authority on the issue, the comparative approach generally has been
rejected in fraud actions. 40 It is unlikely that South Carolina, which
137. See HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 2, at 254-58.
138. See id. at 134.
139. See id. at 232.
140. See, e.g., Tratchel v. Essex Group, Inc., 452 N.W.2d 171 (Iowa 1990) (finding
that Iowa's comparative fault statute does not apply to fraud actions); UNIF. COMP.
FAULT AcT § 1 cmt., 12 U.LA 43-44 (Supp. 1991) (stating that economic loss incurred as
the result of misrepresentation is not covered by the Act, but courts may decide to apply
the comparative fault principle to those cases if supported by the common law). In
Florenzano v. Olson, 358 N.W.2d 175 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 387
N.W.2d 168 (Minn. 1986), the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that Minnesota's com-
parative fault statute did not apply to fraudulent misrepresentations. In reversing the
court of appeals, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that the comparative fault statute
did apply to negligent misrepresentations. 387 N.W.2d at 176.
The rejection of comparative fault in the fraud context is based on two grounds.
First, fraud is akin to intentional wrongdoing, id. at 173, and comparative fault is not
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only recently adopted comparative negligence, will suddenly become a
leader in expanding the comparative approach. Second, it is not clear
how comparative fault would apply because contributory negligence is
not a defense to fraud.
1 4 1
Comparative fault perhaps could be applied to fraud if it is ap-
plied to specific elements of the claim, rather than to contributory neg-
ligence as an affirmative defense. 42 More specifically, if the compara-
tive approach is extended to fraud, it could have an impact on the
current requirement that the reliance by the victim in a fraud action
be legitimate or reasonable.143 Under such a comparative approach a
plaintiff who suffered from unreasonable reliance on a fraudulent mis-
representation could still recover for fraud. The recovery would be re-
duced, however, by that share of the fault encompassed by the plain-
tiff's unreasonable reliance.
2. Negligent Misrepresentation
South Carolina appears to have recognized a claim for negligent
misrepresentation. 4 4 A claim for negligent misrepresentation would
seem to fall within the literal language of Nelson. However, the impact
of Nelson, if any, on this tort is not clear because the precise elements
of and defenses to the tort of negligent misrepresentation have not yet
applicable to intentional torts, id. at 175. Second, "pure economic loss" is not an area in
which comparative principles should be used. UNIF. CoMP. FAULT ACT § 1 cmt., 12 U.LA
44 (Supp. 1991).
141. See HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 2, at 291. This rule is based on two concerns:
The fraudulent actor has engaged in serious wrongdoing, and the plaintiff's recovery is
limited by the requirement that the reliance was reasonable. See Florenzano, 358
N.W.2d at 176; RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF ToRTs § 545A cmts. a & b (1977).
142. For the specific elements of a fraud claim, see HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 2,
at 273.
143. See id. at 283. It might be more precise to phrase the comparison in terms of
comparative recklessness because scienter is phrased in terms of intentional or reckless
disregard and legitimate reliance also is phrased in terms of recklessness. See id. at 280-
81, 283-87.
144. The cases have focused on situations that involve economic loss. See, e.g., Gilli-
land v. Elmwood Properties, 301 S.C. 295, 301, 391 S.E.2d 577, 580 (1990); South Caro-
lina State Ports Auth. v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 289 S.C. 373, 346 S.E.2d 304
(1986); F. Patrick Hubbard, "Economic Loss from Negligent Misrepresentation" in Busi-
ness Torts 29-54 (May 24-25, 1991) (CLE materials, South Carolina Bar, No. 91-19). It is
likely that courts would recognize a cause of action when physical harm is involved be-
cause the legal system generally provides greater protection for physical harm than eco-
nomic loss. See Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Mfg. Co., 299 S.C. 335, 384 S.E.2d 730
(1989). In addition, § 311 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes a cause of
action for physical harm caused by negligent misrepresentation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 311 (1977).
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been explicitly developed in South Carolina. In particular, it is not
clear if and how a requirement of reasonable reliance by the victim will
be used in determining liability for negligent misrepresentation.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that a plaintiff can-
not recover for negligent misrepresentation unless the victim's reliance
on the misrepresentation is reasonable or justifiable. 145 Although the
nature of this requirement is not entirely clear, the Restatement does
not equate justifiable or reasonable reliance with the exercise of due
care. The fraud portions of the Restatement indicate that justifiable
reliance is not defined in terms of reasonable care and that a person
can, in certain circumstances, justifiably rely on a representation with-
out investigating the representation's validity even though a reasona-
bly prudent person would investigate. '4 Thus, particular victims might
satisfy the standard of justifiable reliance, yet be negligent in investi-
gating or failing to investigate on their own. In this fact situation the
victim's reliance would be justified, but the contributory negligence
would apparently be a defense to recovery under the Restatement.
147
South Carolina's approach is arguably consistent with the Restate-
ment because the standard by which justifiable reliance is measured in
fraud cases is recklessness, not negligence.148 Thus, because negligent
misrepresentation is a negligence action, contributory negligence by a
plaintiff who justifiably relied on a negligent misrepresentation would
be treated in the comparative approach established by Nelson.149 Com-
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 311, 552 (1977). Section 311 provides:
(1) One who negligently gives false information to another is subject to liability
for physical harm caused by action taken by the other in reasonable reliance
upon such information, where such harm results
(a) to the other, or
(b) to such third persons as the actor should expect to be put in peril by
the action taken.
(2) Such negligence may consist of failure to exercise reasonable care
(a) in ascertaining the accuracy of the information, or
(b) in the manner in which it is communicated.
Id. § 311 (emphasis added). The relevant portion of § 552 provides:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any
other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false informa-
tion for the 'guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to lia-
bility for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the
information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining
or communicating the information.
Id. § 552 (emphasis added).
146. Id. § 545A cmt. b; see also id. § 552 cmt. e (discussing instances in which a
victim is entitled to expect a particular level of care by the supplier of information).
147. See id. § 552A.
148. See HUBBARD & FEix, supra note 2, at 285.
149. Other jurisdictions have adopted this approach and held that their comparative
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parative negligence may not apply, however, if the defendant is a fidu-
ciary with a duty to protect the victim from the victim's own
imprudence. 150
3. Other Misrepresentation
Misrepresentation claims also can be based on equity or on con-
tract.'5 ' Unless Nelson is expanded considerably, any negligence or
other conduct by the plaintiff would not be treated in a comparative
manner if the claim is equitable or contractual.
Section 402B of the Restatement imposes strict liability for physi-
cal harm resulting from misrepresentations made about a chattel by
one in the business of selling that chattel.152 South Carolina has not
had occasion to consider or to adopt this cause of action.153 If section
402B is statutorily adopted in South Carolina, the analysis of the im-
pact of Nelson would parallel the analysis of the statutory products
liability scheme based on section 402A.154 If section 402B is judicially
adopted, then the analysis would parallel the discussion of the judi-
cially adopted strict liability doctrine. 5
5
schemes apply to negligent misrepresentation. See, e.g., Robinson v. Poudre Valley Fed.
Credit Union, 654 P.2d 861, 863 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); Florenzano v. Olson, 387 N.W.2d
168, 176 (Minn. 1986). One California appellate court refused, however, to apply compar-
ative fault to negligent misrepresentation on the ground that comparative fault "has no
place in the context of ordinary business transactions." Carroll v. Gava, 159 Cal. Rptr.
778, 781 (Ct. App. 1979).
The Restatement notes that the wisdom of extending comparative negligence to sit-
uations that involve pecuniary harm rather than physical harm is debatable. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552A cmt. b (1977). The Uniform Comparative Fault Act
indicates a preference for excluding economic loss from the comparative system. See
UNIF. CoMP. FAULT ACT § 1 cmt., 12 U.L.A. 43 (Supp. 1991).
150. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
151. See HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 2, at 281-82.
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1977). Section 402B provides:
One engaged in the business of selling chattels who, by advertising, labels, or
otherwise, makes to the public a misrepresentation of a material fact concern-
ing the character or quality of a chattel sold by him is subject to liability for
physical harm to a consumer of the chattel caused by justifiable reliance upon
the misrepresentation, even though
(a) it is not made fraudulently or negligently, and
(b) the consumer has not bought the chattel from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
153. Cf. HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 2, at 236 (discussing potential effects of
adoption).
154. See supra notes 118-27 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
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E. Nuisance
The argument in favor of Nelson's application to nuisance cases
would be premised on the requirement that a defendant's interference
with a plaintiff's use and enjoyment of land must be "unreasonable" to
constitute a nuisance.56 In addition, the argument could rely on the
fact that a lawful activity can become a nuisance if the activity is negli-
gently conducted.157 In cases in which a nuisance results from negligent
but lawful conduct, contributory negligence would be a defense and
comparative negligence would be applicable."5 ,
The argument against applying Nelson to nuisance cases would
stress two points. First, Nelson refers to negligence actions, not to un-
reasonable or faulty conduct. Second, the term "unreasonable" is used
differently in the nuisance context than it is in the negligence
context.
1 59
In any event, it is not clear whether defenses to nuisance exist in
which the plaintiff's conduct would be analogous to contributory negli-
gence in a negligence action. With the possible exception of situations
in which negligence is the sole basis of a nuisance claim, contributory
negligence does not appear to be a defense to nuisance in South
Carolina. 60
The doctrine of coming to the nuisance ls  arguably is analogous to
assumption of the risk in a negligence context. However, even though
indications exist that a plaintiff who comes to the nuisance might be
barred from suing for nuisance in South Carolina,162 it is not clear
whether or how the defense of coming to the nuisance would be ap-
plied. Most jurisdictions do not currently treat coming to the nuisance
as a defense. 6 There appears to be no case that uses the doctrine in a
156. 58 AM. JuR. 2D Nuisances § 8 (1989); see also HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 2,
at 165 (discussing the elements of actionable nuisances).
157. See, e.g., Conestee Mills v. City of Greenville, 160 S.C. 10, 18, 158 S.E. 113, 116
(1931).
158. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 14, § 11.3.
159. Compare HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 2, at 34-40 with id. at 167-68. But see
id. at 166-67 (stating that many factors that are relevant to reasonableness of use also
are relevant to negligence). In some cases negligence can be the basis for treating the
interference as unreasonable. In those cases the strength of the argument that the term
"unreasonableness" differs in meaning according to its context is substantially weakened.
160. See id. at 183. If negligence is the basis for finding that the interference is
-unreasonable, however, the result might be different. If the nuisance involves negligence,
the negligence might itself "be an additional basis of liability under some circum-
stances." Id. at 167.
161. See 'id. at 183-84.
162. Id. at 184-85.
163. See id.
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comparative fault approach. A final problem with this approach is that
it is not clear whether Nelson applies to assumption of risk in a negli-
gence action.
16
4
F. Standards of Care That Are Less Than Due Care
Many areas exist in which a defendant is not liable unless the de-
fendant has breached a standard of care less demanding than that of
due care.165 For example, owners and occupiers owe adult trespassers a
duty less than that of due care. 1as These lesser standards also are ap-
plicable in the wide range of situations in which statutes limit liability
in order to encourage citizens to engage in socially useful activities. For
example, persons who stop and render aid at accidents are not liable
for mere negligence. They may be liable only for bad faith, or "gross
negligence or willful or wanton misconduct."
6 7
Determining whether and how Nelson might apply to these areas
involves two issues. First, does the scheme that establishes a lesser
standard also provide for the denial of recovery based on the victim's
conduct in a manner that is similar to contributory negligence? These
limits on a plaintiff's right to sue may apply to owners and occupi-
ers,16 8 but statutory schemes vary so widely that no generalizations are
possible. Second, liability based on gross negligence perhaps can be
viewed as an action in negligence, but liability based on bad faith or on
willful and wanton conduct would require an expansion of Nelson. The
issues involved in answering this second question are similar to those
involved in considering whether recklessness will be included."6 9
164. See supra notes 84-110 and accompanying text.
165. The standard of due care requires one to take reasonable precautions. To de-
termine if a defendant's conduct was reasonable, "two basic tests are used: (1) the
calculus of risk standard, and (2) the reasonable person standard." HUBBARD & FELIX,
supra note 2, at 34.
166. See id. at 76. The owner or occupier may not, however, act intentionally or
wantonly.
167. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1-310 (Law. Co-op. 1976). For other examples of this type
of statute, see HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 2, at 163.
168. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 342(c) (1977). For example, § 342(c) of the
Restatement indicates that a possessor of land is not liable to a licensee for injury caused
by a condition of the land if the licensee knows or has reason to know of the risk in-
volved. Id. § 342. This limit on liability is akin to the affirmative defense of contributory
negligence.
169. See supra notes 43-56 and accompanying text. For an example of a case that
recognized the affirmative defense of comparative bad faith in an action by the injured
victim against an insurance company for bad faith in handling a claim, see California
Casualty Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 218 Cal. Rptr. 817 (Ct. App. 1985).
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V. MULTIPLE PLAINTIFFS
Nelson contains a short discussion of the treatment of multiple
defendants, 170 but it does not discuss the problem of multiple plain-
tiffs. The following hypothetical illustrates some problems that may
arise when multiple plaintiffs are involved: (1) A child, with the mother
standing by, has been injured as result of being hit in the street by a
car driven by the defendant; (2) both the child and the mother are
negligent; (3) the child sues the defendant for the injuries; (4) the
mother sues the defendant for her emotional distress caused by seeing
her child being hit by the car17 1 ; and (5) the child and the mother are
each thirty percent at fault and the defendant is forty percent at fault.
Two questions that remain unanswered in this type of situation are
whether the fault of the plaintiffs will be considered separately or
jointly in these actions 17 2 and whether the fault of the child will be
compared to the combined fault of the mother and of the defendant
driver or only to the fault of the defendant? 7 3
VI. MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS
Although Nelson mandated that a court must compare a plaintiff's
negligence to the combined negligence of all of the defendants, it did
not address many of the other issues raised by situations involving
multiple wrongdoers. These issues are analyzed in the following
discussion.
A. Joint and Several Liability, Contribution, and Indemnity
Nelson established a comparative system for allocating liability
between a plaintiff and multiple defendants. However, Nelson does not
170. Nelson indicates that "[i]f there is more than one defendant, the plaintiff's
negligence shall be compared to the combined negligence of all defendants." 303 S.C. at
245, 399 S.E.2d at 784 (citing Elder v. Orluck, 515 A.2d 517 (Pa. 1986)). This approach is
followed in the majority of states. See Table 4.
171. The Supreme Court of South Carolina recognized the tort of negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress in certain bystander situations in Kinard v. Augusta Sash &
Door Co., 286 S.C. 579, 336 S.E.2d 465 (1985).
172. A court might impute the fault of the child to the mother in any event. See
HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 2, at 146-47. However, a court would not impute any fault
of the mother to the child. See Cirsosky v. Smathers, 128 S.C. 358, 360, 122 S.E. 864, 864
(1924).
173. This question overlaps somewhat with the phantom defendant question. See
infra notes 190-99 and accompanying text. Similar problems might arise in wrongful
death actions, see HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 2, at 521-22, and in actions for loss of
consortium, see id. at 146 & n.67.
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address the allocation of liability among these multiple defendants.
Thus, the opinion does not explicitly affect the existing rules of joint
and several liability,17 contribution, 78 and indemnity. 6
However, a conceptual tension exists between the comparative ap-
proach of Nelson and the current use of noncomparative approaches to
joint and several liability, contribution, and indemnity. For example,
the allocation of liability between a plaintiff and multiple defendants
according to percentages of negligence seems inconsistent with the pro
rata approach of the Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act' for allo-
cating liability among defendants. 7 8 Similarly, it seems inconsistent to
emphasize the percentage of wrongdoing as the basis for allocating lia-
bility between a plaintiff and multiple defendants, 79 yet to deny a
strictly liable defendant any right to indemnity from a reckless
codefendant. 80
Given the conflicts in the underlying approach, the adoption of a
comparative approach in Nelson may indicate a possible shift to allo-
cation of liability among defendants.'' However, such a shift would
certainly involve an expansion of Nelson, not merely an application.
This broad expansion is unlikely in the near future. Moreover, because
contribution is a statutory right, the courts are particularly unlikely to
alter the current approach to contribution.
The South Carolina Tort Claims Act'8 2 suggests one possible legis-
174. See HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 2, at 547-48.
175. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-38-10 to -70 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990); HUBBARD & FELIX,
supra note 2, at 549-51.
176. See HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 2, at 552-53.
177. SC. CODE ANN. §§ 15-38-10 to -70 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
178. See id. § 15-38-30. But see id. § 15-78-100(c) (requiring allocation of propor-
tional liability among defendants if the action is brought under the Tort Claims Act). A
similar inconsistency arises because a defendant who was 80% at fault is entitled to
contribution, while a plaintiff who was 80% at fault is denied recovery.
South Carolina's Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act is based on the Uniform Con-
tribution Among Tortfeasors Act promulgated in 1955. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-
38-10 to -70 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990) with UNIF. CONTRIB. AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT §§
1-9, 12 U.L.A. 63-107 (1975). The Uniform Comparative Fault Act replaces the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act and has a comparative approach. See UNIF. CoMP.
FAULT ACT prefatory note, 12 U.LA 41-42 (Supp. 1991).
179. See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
180. See Scott v. Fruehauf Corp., 302 S.C. 364, 396 S.E.2d 354 (1990).
181. Many states have adopted a pure comparative approach to contribution among
tortfeasors. See UNIF. Cohip. FAULT AcT §§ 1-6, 12 U.L.A. 43-55 (Supp. 1991); SCHWARTZ,
supra note 14, § 16.7, at 276-77. However, those states that have adopted this approach
have pure comparative fault schemes. The effect of a modified comparative scheme on
contribution among tortfeasors is uncertain. If a plaintiff is 30% at fault, one defendant
55% at fault, and another defendant 15% percent at fault, would any contribution from
the 15%-at-fault defendant be required?
182. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-78-10 to -190 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
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lative approach to a comparative scheme for contribution. One provi-
sion of the Act, which adopts a pure comparative approach to contri-
bution when governmental defendants are involved, provides:, "In all
actions brought pursuant to this chapter when an alleged joint
tortfeasor is named as party defendant in addition to the governmental
entity, the trier of fact must return a special verdict specifying the pro-
portion of monetary liability of each defendant against whom liability
is determined.'
1 83
There are two important points about this statute. First, it adopts
a very broad approach to comparative assessment because it refers to
"the proportion of monetary liability," not to the proportion of negli-
gence or fault. The reason for the legislature's broad approach to com-
parative liability is unclear. Second, this statute apparently adopts a
pure comparative system. Adopting a pure system for contribution
among defendants while maintaining a modified system for plaintiffs
raises questions of consistency and fairness.1
8 4
B. Causation Issues
Nelson leaves many causation issues that involve multiple wrong-
doers unresolved. For example, under current South Carolina law the
conduct of an intervening wrongdoer is sometimes viewed as breaking
the chain of causation and superseding the original wrongdoer's negli-
gence. As a result, the original wrongdoer is not viewed as proximately
causing the plaintiffs injury, even though that wrongdoer's conduct
was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injury. 8 5 If South Carolina contin-
ues to use this approach, will the negligence of both the intervening
and the original wrongdoer be compared to the plaintiff's negligence
under Nelson? s 6 It can be argued that the answer should be "yes" and
that the comparative approach of Nelson should be extended to proxi-
mate cause analysis so that the original wrongdoer will bear some share
of liability.1
87
Without this shift the jury cannot consider the negligence of the
original defendant in the negligence comparison because the second de-
fendant's conduct was so wrongful. Therefore, plaintiffs may fare bet-
ter when the intervening tortfeasors' wrongdoing was less because the
183. Id. § 15-78-100(c).
184. See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., Hensley v. Heavrin, 277 S.C. 86, 282 S.E.2d 854 (1981) (per curiam);
Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 242 S.E.2d 671 (1978).
186. If one of these wrongdoers is not a party to the suit, this problem will overlap
with the phantom defendant problem. See infra notes 189-99 and accompanying text.
187. The issue of determining this share parallels, to some extent, the questions of
contribution and indemnity. See supra notes 174-84 and accompanying text. ,
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plaintiffs then could compare their wrong to the combined negligence
of all defendants. This difference is contrary to the rationale that un-
derlies Nelson's adoption of the modified comparative approach.188
Causation issues also may arise when it is possible to apportion
damages between two defendants. Consider, for example, the following
hypothetical: One defendant negligently hits and disables the plain-
tiff's automobile, a second defendant then negligently hits the disabled
car, and it is possible to apportion the damages between the two colli-
sions. In this situation the second defendant is liable only for the dam-
ages from the second collision. The first driver is liable for all of the
damages if the second collision was foreseeable. 8 9
Conceptual clarity suggests that, under Nelson, the court would
take into account the negligence of both defendants for the injury
caused by the second collision, but not for the injury from the first
collision. However, this approach could reach an anomalous result. If
the plaintiff is forty percent negligent and each defendant is thirty per-
cent negligent, the plaintiff would partially recover for the second colli-
sion, but would not recover for the first collision. This type of problem
is inherent in the modified system of comparative negligence.
C. Phantom Defendants
Nelson indicates that "the plaintiff's negligence shall be compared
to the combined negligence of all defendants."1 90 Whether the compar-
ison is limited to defendants who are actual parties to the suit is un-
clear. Some states that have adopted comparative negligence include
phantom defendants in the equation. 19' The term "phantom defend-
ant" refers to a wrongdoer who causes the plaintiff's injury in part, but
who is not a named party to the suit. 9 2 For example, because of the
exclusivity of workers' compensation as a remedy for employment-re-
lated injuries,1 93 an employer who negligently alters a machine will not
be a party to a suit for negligent design brought by the injured em-
ployee against the manufacturer of the machine. Other states do not
provide a clear pattern of authority on whether the plaintiff employee's
negligence can be compared to the manufacturer's alone, or to both the
188. See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
189. See HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 2, at 554; cf. Rourk v. Selvey, 252 S.C. 25,
164 S.E.2d 909 (1968) (apportioning damages by cause-in-fact among tortfeasors).
190. Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 303 S.C. 243, 245, 399 S.E.2d 783, 784 (1991)
(citing Elder v. Orluck, 515 A.2d 517 (Pa. 1986)).
191. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 29, § 367, at 475.
192. See id.
193. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-540 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
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manufacturer's and the employer's. 194
Including phantom defendants in the Nelson computation would
present difficult issues. For example, determining the percentage of
negligence of an absent person or entity can be troublesome. This de-
termination must be done in a manner that is sufficiently fair to bind
the parties to the suit. However, it is unclear which party should be
required to argue that the absent defendant was negligent. Plaintiffs
face a tactical dilemma in arguing that an absent person was at fault:
often plaintiffs will want to compare their own fault with the combined
fault of all the wrongdoers, but plaintiffs also face the risk that the
court will find an absent nonparty defendant to be an intervening
wrongdoer who was the sole proximate cause and therefore solely lia-
ble. 195 Defendants face the converse dilemma.
Under the current rules of joint and several liability, serious
problems of fairness to defendants could arise in situations in which a
phantom defendant is either judgment proof or immune from suit. For
example, in the hypothetical products liability suit for workplace in-
jury, 9" the percentage of negligence could be employer, sixty-five per-
cent; employee, twenty-five percent; and manufacturer, ten percent. If
the Nelson comparison includes the negligence of the employer, the
plaintiff will recover damages for seventy-five percent of the injuries.
The manufacturer, whose share of negligence is only ten percent,
would then pay the total amount of damages for the seventy-five per-
cent of injuries. The manufacturer probably will have no right of con-
tribution from the employer,'9 7 who is substantially more at fault.
Moreover, the employer or its workers' compensation carrier has a
right of subrogation from the plaintiff employee for any workers' com-
pensation payments made to the employee.' 98
On the other hand, the exclusion of phantom defendants from
consideration also presents problems. One problem is that a plaintiff
who is less than fifty percent at fault compared to all wrongdoers, in-
cluding a phantom defendant, receives no recovery if the plaintiff is
194. See Table 4.
195. For a discussion of proximate cause and intervening wrongdoers, see HUBBARD
& FELiX, supra note 2, at 112-17.
196. See supra text following note 193.
197. The right of contribution from a party is premised on whether that party is
jointly and severally liable. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-20(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
The employer does not satisfy that requirement because it is immune from liability. See
id. § 42-1-540 (Law. Co-op. 1976). For a general discussion regarding the product manu-
facturer's right of contribution from employers, see Jonathan M. Weisgall, Product Lia-
bility in the Workplace: The Effect of Workers' Compensation on the Rights and Lia-
bilities of Third Parties, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 1035, 1058-71 (1977).
198. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-560(b) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
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more at fault than the party defendants. This result is contrary to the
rationale behind the modified system of comparative fault.19
Another problem arises when there is a potential settlement with
one defendant. Because a person who settles is not a party defendant,
that person's negligence might not be included in the Nelson compari-
son. However, if the negligence of the settling defendant is not in-
cluded in the Nelson comparison, plaintiffs and defendants will face
substantial disincentives to settlement. For example, in those situa-
tions in which a plaintiff's own negligence might be less than the negli-
gence of the two potential defendants combined, but greater than the
negligence of either defendant alone, the plaintiff would be reluctant to
settle.
Moreover, a plaintiff will be reluctant to settle even if the plain-
tiff's share of the negligence is less than that of the party defendant.
For example, the shares of negligence could be as follows: Plaintiff,
one-third; party defendant, one-third; settling defendant, one-third. If
the fault of the settling defendant is excluded, plaintiff's share and the
party defendant's share will be equal. Each will be viewed as fifty per-
cent at fault. If the plaintiff's damages are $30,000, two scenarios are
possible. First, if no one settles, both tortfeasors would be party de-
fendants, and the plaintiff would receive two-thirds of the total dam-
age ($20,000). Second, if one tortfeasor settles for $10,000 (a one-third
share), only one party defendant remains. In this second scenario the
plaintiff and the remaining defendant would be equally at fault, and
the plaintiff therefore would be entitled to only $15,000 under Nelson.
The net recovery might be limited to $15,000 because the Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act may require that the settlement amount of
$10,000 be subtracted from the judgment.200 Thus, if the Act applies in
199. See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
200. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-38-10 to -70 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990). Section 15-38-50
of the Act provides:
When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgement is given in
good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or
the same wrongful death:
(1) it does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for
the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide, but it reduces
the claim against the others to the extent of any amount stipulated by
the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid
for it, whichever is the greater; and
(2) it discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for
contribution to any other tortfeasor.
Id. § 15-38-50 (emphasis added). The phrase "reduces the claim against the others" is
interpreted to mean the claim amount after the Nelson reduction is made. Thus, the
plaintiff's claim is $15,000 (one-half of $30,000), the settling defendant has paid $10,000,
and the other defendant will be liable for $15,000. The phrase also can be interpreted in
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this way, a plaintiff will be reluctant to settle with a defendant even if
the defendant offers a fair settlement of that defendant's one-third
share. On the other hand, a defendant will be reluctant to settle for
more than the defendant's share of $10,000.
Thus, excluding settling defendants from the Nelson calculation
reduces incentives to settle. However, settlements should be the fa-
vored form of dispute resolution. Consequently, a method that encour-
ages settlements is desirable.
Two alternative approaches achieve this result. First, even if non-
party defendants are excluded from the Nelson calculations, settling
defendants could be included. Although this inclusion might compli-
cate trial, this complication may be worth the benefits it offers in en-
couraging settlements. Because of this concern, many states include
settling defendants and exclude other nonparty tortfeasors2 0 1 Second,
the relevant portions of the Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act 202
could be interpreted to provide for deducting the amount of the settle-
ment from the total amount of damages.20 3 This second approach sim-
plifies trials. However, it also limits the use of general verdicts because
the jury would be required to provide the trial judge with an amount of
total damages and with a percentage of the plaintiff's fault.
The phantom defendant problem is distinguishable from questions
of proximate cause. Under current law, for example, the product manu-
a way that would avoid this result and allow the plaintiff to recover $20,000 even if there
is a settlement. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
201. See generally Table 4. If settling defendants are included in the comparison,
the reduction in recovery required by § 15-38-50 of the South Carolina Code, S.C. CODE
ANN. § 15-38-50 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1990), should be made to the amount of the plain-
tiff's claim after the claim has been reduced by the plaintiff's share of the fault. See
infra note 203. In contrast, if the settling defendant's share is not included, the reduc-
tion should be based on the full amount of the plaintiff's damages before any reduction
for the plaintiff's share of fault. The goal in both approaches is to ensure that there is no
benefit or detriment to the plaintiff because of the choice to settle. For a general discus-
sion of reduction in recovery because of a settlement in the context of comparative fault,
see Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Comparative Fault: Calculation of Net Recovery by
Applying Percentage of Plaintiff's Fault Before or After Subtracting Amount of Settle-
ment by Less Than All Joint Tortfeasors, 71 A.L.R4TH 11'08 (1989).
202. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-38-10 to -70 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990); see also supra
note 200 and accompanying text.
203. For examples of the use of this approach, see Ghent, supra note 201. If this
alternative approach is used in the hypothetical, see supra text preceding note 200, the
following calculations are required: The settlement of $10,000 is subtracted from the to-
tal claim of $30,000, and the remaining $20,000 is allocated equally to the plaintiff and
the party defendant. I
The plaintiff receives the same net recovery, $20,000, regardless of settlement. The
approach to making a reduction because of a settlement is different if-the fault of the
settling defendant is included in the Nelson comparison. See supra note 200 and accom-
panying text.
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facturer in the above hypothetical can avoid liability if it successfully
argues that the employer's conduct was the sole proximate cause of the
injury and its negligence is irrelevant under Nelson. If this argument is
still viable after Nelson, the manufacturer would not be liable if its
product or conduct was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's in-
jury. However, the phantom defendant problem typically arises in situ-
ations in which each multiple wrongdoer has proximately caused the
plaintiff's damages, but one of the wrongdoers is not a party to the
suit. Thus, the problem could not arise in the hypothetical products
liability suit204 unless both the manufacturer and the employer had en-
gaged in conduct which was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.
VII. THE QUESTION OF SETOFF
When both the plaintiff and defendant are equally at fault, each
can recover from the other under Nelson.10 5 This scenario presents the
issue of whether the damages for the plaintiff's claim and for the de-
fendant's counterclaim will both be paid or whether the recovery of the
one with the larger damages award will be reduced by a setoff.206
If liability insurance is involved, prohibiting a setoff has advan-
tages. Each party would prefer to recover its full share of damages and
force the insurance company, or companies, to bear the cost of the
awards. Prohibiting setoff also serves public policy goals. For example,
in motor vehicle cases, which are the most common form of a tort case
that results in jury verdicts, 20 7 the South Carolina Motor Vehicle Fi-
nancial Responsibility Act reflects a policy concern for compensa-
tion.208 A prohibition of setoffs in motor vehicle cases would further
this concern because prohibiting setoff requires the insurers to pay
claims.209
204. See supra text following note 193.
205. A corresponding right of recovery also could arise in cases involving two de-
fendants who together are more at fault than the plaintiff but individually less at fault.
A claim by one of these defendants against the plaintiff and the other defendant might
be partially recoverable under Nelson.
206. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 14, §§ 19.1-.3.
207. See, e.g., F. Patrick Hubbard, "Patterns" in Civil Jury Verdicts in the State
Circuit Courts of South Carolina: 1976-1985, 38 S.C. L. REv. 699, 717, 727-29 (1987).
208. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-9-10 to -630 (Law. Co-op. 1991); see also Evans v.
American Home Assurance Co., 252 S.C. 417, 420, 166 S.E.2d 811, 812 (1969) (applying
former act); cf. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mumford, 299 S.C. 14, 382
S.E.2d 11 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that the legislature did not intend to permit insurers
to escape liability for intentional accidents through exclusionary clauses in their insur-
ance contracts).
209. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act adopts a hybrid approach to setoff. UNIF.
CoM . FAULT ACT § 3, 12 U.L.A. 50 (Supp. 1991). Section 3 of the Act provides:
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However, prohibiting setoff is subject to objections. Setoff might
lower liability insurance rates.21 0 Setoff also might reduce the incentive
of plaintiffs to litigate because the use of setoff lessens the expected
amount of recovery. Moreover, there may be situations in which it
would be unfair to prohibit setoff while still requiring payment of a
judgment. For example, if only one party can pay the judgment, either
because of insurance or personal assets, to compel only that able party
to pay arguably is unfair.
Traditionally, courts view setoff as an equitable remedy to be used
to achieve a just and fair result. The courts have considered a party's
insurance coverage or insolvency when deciding whether setoff would
be just and fair.21  To remain consistent with this traditional view, the
best approach to setoff under Nelson is to give the trial judge discre-
tion in each case to reach a fair allocation. The experience gained from
a case-by-case approach could be used in the future to determine
whether and how to draft a more precise rule governing setoff.
VIII. LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY
South Carolina has a number of statutory limitations on liabil-
ity.21 2 The policy that underlies these statutory liability limits is the
A claim and counterclaim shall not be set off against each other, except by
agreement of both parties. On motion, however, the court, if it finds that the
obligation of either party is likely to be uncollectible, may order that both par-
ties make payment into court for distribution. The court shall distribute the
funds received and declare obligations discharged as if the payment into court
by either party had been a payment to the other party and any distribution of
those funds back to the party making payment had been a payment to him by
the other party.
Id.; see also id. § 3 cmt. (explaining approach through illustrations). Rhode Island's stat-
ute appears to prohibit setoff in comparative fault situations. RI. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4.1
(1985). Arizona allows setoff only by agreement. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2507 (Supp.
1990). California appears to have prohibited setoff in insurance situations. See Jess v.
Herrmann, 604 P.2d 208, 214-15 (Cal. 1979).
210. The savings in liability insurance rates may be offset, at least in part, by an
increase in first-party insurance rates. The savings also will result in less spreading of the
cost of accidents and thus frustrate an underlying goal of accident law. See HUBBARD &
FELIX, supra note 2, at 10-12. However, because loss spreading is a goal of tort law, a
strong argument in favor of first-party insurance is that it is cheaper and fairer than
third-party liability insurance. See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and
Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1552-53 (1987). When the payment is from per-
sonal assets, a prohibition on setoff cannot be based on a loss spreading rationale.
211. See, e.g., Jess, 604 P.2d at 214-15 (insurance); Ex parte Mechanics Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 199 S.C. 23, 29-31, 18 S.E.2d 592, 594-95 (1942) (insurance); Carwile v. Met-
ropolitan Life Ins. Co., 136 S.C. 179, 198-99, 134 S.E. 285, 291 (1926) (per curiam) (insol-
vency); 20 AM. JUR. 2D Counterclaim, Recoupment, and Setoff §§ 7, 18, 24-29 (1965).
212. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-120 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990) (limiting liabil-
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preservation of resources.2 13 Consequently, these limits should be im-
posed on any actual judgment after the Nelson comparative calcula-
tions have been made and not on the total amount of damages. Under
this approach the judge, not the jury, should make the reduction to the
statutory limit.
IX. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Punitive damages involve different goals and concerns than com-
pensatory damages. Punitive damages focus on the wrongdoing of the
defendant and have two basic goals: A vindicative or retributive role in
condemning wrongdoing, reasserting rights, and making wrongdoers
suffer their just desserts; and a deterrent role when compensatory
damages alone cannot deter wrongdoing.214 Compensatory damages
also vindicate rights and deter wrongs, but the main concern is the
victim's loss; this concern is the basis of the right to compensatory
damages. 210 As a result, compensatory damages are measured by the
injury to the plaintiff, not the wrongdoing of the defendant.
The differences between compensatory and punitive damages are
important when formulating a comparative fault system. In determin-
ing compensatory damages the focus is on the plaintiff's loss. The rela-
tive role of the plaintiff's own misconduct in causing the loss therefore
should play a significant role. However, when determining punitive
damages, the focus is on the defendant's wrongdoing. Therefore, any
misconduct of the plaintiff is irrelevant,2"' and there is no reason to
compare the fault or negligence of the plaintiff with the conduct of the
defendant when determining punitive damages. Thus, other jurisdic-
tions have generally rejected comparative approaches to punitive
damages.11
ity of governmental entities under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act); id. § 33-55-210
(Law. Co-op. 1990) (limiting liability of charities).
213. See Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Servs., 297 S.C. 430, 437, 377 S.E.2d 323,
327 (1989) (per curiam) (describing the legislative purpose behind limit on charitable
organizations' liability).
214. HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 2, at 506-08; see Gamble v. Stevenson, 406 S.E.2d
350, 354 (S.C. 1991).
215. See HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 2, at 464.
216. When the plaintiff provokes the defendant's misconduct, the provocation is
clearly related to the defendant's wrongdoing and therefore relevant to punitive dam-
ages. See HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 2, at 511. No clear relationship exists if a plain-
tiff's negligence relates only to the plaintiff's injury and not to the defendant's conduct.
217. See SCiiWARTZ, supra note 14, § 5.4 (discussing comparative negligence and pu-
nitive damages for intentional torts). In a few rare fact situations Nelson could have the
effect of allowing punitive damages when they previously would have been denied. Under
the old rules a contributorily negligent plaintiff could recover both full actual damages
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X. POSSIBLE JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Drafting pattern jury instructions under Nelson involves at least
two problems. First, drafting jury charges requires certainty about the
substantive law involved. However, as the preceding discussion indi-
cates, considerable uncertainty exists about Nelson's application in a
number of contexts. Second, a problem encountered with any set of
pattern charges is that the charges often require expansion or rephras-
ing in order to apply them to the circumstances of a particular case.
2
2
8
The following proposed charges illustrate approaches that may be
used in charging the jury on comparative negligence issues. Although
not all of the proposed charges provide for defendant counterclaims,
each could be easily modified to fit defendant counterclaims. Similarly,
the charges can be modified for cases in which there are multiple de-
fendants. If multiple defendants are involved, separate percentages for
each defendant may be advisable. For example, if one defendant is
granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, separate percentages
will enable the court to enter judgment against the other defendants
without the need for a new trial.
and punitive damages from a reckless defendant. However, a contributorily reckless
plaintiff would be barred from any recovery of actual damages. Because punitive dam-
ages are not allowed unless some actual damages are awarded, the reckless plaintiff also
would be barred from recovering any punitive damages. HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 2,
at 506. This bar to recovery for a contributorily reckless plaintiff would be changed in
some cases if recklessness is treated in a comparative manner because a contributorily
reckless plaintiff would not be baired from recovery if the plaintiff's share of negligence
or recklessness was less than the defendant's.
However, this change in the ultimate result should not be used as a basis for includ-
ing punitive damages in a comparative scheme. Punitive damages are based on the de-
fendant's wrongdoing, and the serendipitous fact that the plaintiff was reckless should
not bar a recovery that is based on that wrongdoing. This bar would frustrate the goals
of punitive damages. The recklessness of the plaintiff is irrelevant, particularly because
there would be no right under Nelson to recover any damages, whether compensatory or
punitive, if the plaintiff's share of recklessness exceeded the defendant's.
218. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 403 S.E.2d 162 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, No.
1641, Advance Sheet 17 (S.C. July 3, 1991).
It is not always sufficient for a judge to simply open a charge book and read a
generic statement of the law to a jury, no matter how correct that statement
may be in the abstract. This is particularly true where, as here, the judge is
called upon to answer a well-framed question following the initial charge. Quite
often, the judge must tailor, mold and even sculpt the law in fashioning an
answer to fit the question. In this respect, the judge must be an artist, not a
mere technician.
Id. at 164 (citing State v. Fuller, 297 S.C. 440, 443, 377 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1989)). The need
for specificity in the charge complicates the judge's task. If too much emphasis is placed
on the unique features of a case, the requirement that the judge charge the law, not the
facts, may be offended. See S.C. CONsT. art. V, § 21.
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A. Basic Introductory Charge
The following introductory charge does not use the term "contrib-
utory negligence." The terms "plaintiff's negligence" and "defendant's
negligence" are used because they clearly reflect the parallel treatment
of the parties' negligence under a comparative negligence scheme.
The defendant claims that the plaintiff committed an act or acts of
negligence which proximately caused the plaintiff's (injury) (damages)
(losses). I have instructed you about the subject of negligence and
about the plaintiff's claim that the defendant's negligence caused the
plaintiff's (injury) (damages) (losses). If you find by the greater weight
of the evidence that the plaintiff was negligent and that the plaintiff's
negligence contributed to (his) (her) (its) own (injury) (damages)
(losses) as a proximate cause of the (injury) (damages) (losses), you
will then be required to determine to what extent the plaintiff's (in-
jury) (damages) (losses) resulted from (his) (her) (its) own negligence
as compared to the negligence, if any, of the defendant.
B. The Charge Concerning the Comparison
Two basic approaches exist to charge the jury on the comparison
of negligence. Many jurisdictions use interrogatories or special ver-
dicts.2 19 General verdicts also are used.220 Each alternative is presented
below.
1. The Use of Interrogatories or Special Verdict Questions
Special verdicts or jury interrogatories assist the jury in determin-
ing percentages of negligence. 2 1 Special verdicts or interrogatories also
provide the court with information that could be useful when, for ex-
ample, on appeal it is held that one of two defendants was not negli-
gent as a matter of law. Because of these advantages, this approach is
common and some jurisdictions have developed extremely specific ver-
219. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 14, § 17.4, at 305-06.
220. Id.
221. See id. Rule 49 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides for
special verdicts and interrogatories. S.C. R. Civ. P. 49. Their use generally is discretion-
ary. See, e.g., Gamble v. Stevenson, 406 S.E.2d 350, 352 (S.C. 1991) (citing Smoak v.
Liebherr-America, Inc., 281 S.C. 420, 315 S.E.2d 116 (1984)). However, the South Caro-
lina Tort Claims Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-78-10 to -190 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990),
requires a special verdict on the comparative share of a governmental defendant's negli-
gence when an alleged joint tortfeasor is named as an additional party defendant. Id.
§ 15.78-100(c).
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dict forms.222
The following proposed charges use special verdict questions to
provide a useful framework for the basic questions that arise in most
applications of Nelson, which involve a single plaintiff and a single de-
fendant in a simple negligence case. 223 If preferred, interrogatories
could be used.
a. Introductory Charge
I will give you written questions, called special verdict questions.
You will answer these questions by basing your decision on the greater
weight of the evidence. There will be a space for you to indicate your
decisions about the percentage of the plaintiff's negligence, if any,
that directly and proximately caused (his) (her) (its) own (injury)
(damages) (losses) and the percentage of negligence, if any, of the de-
fendant that directly and proximately caused the plaintiff's (injury)
(damages) (losses).
The first two questions require you to decide whether the defend-
ant, , was negligent and whether any negligence by the de-
fendant, - , was the proximate cause of any (injury)(damages)
(losses) to the plaintiff, - Questions 3 and 4 ask the same
questions about any negligence by the plaintiff, _.
If you answer "yes" to all of the first four questions, you will then
answer Question 5. This question asks you to decide to what extent
the plaintiff's negligence directly and proximately caused the (injury)
(damages) (losses) and to what extent the defendant's negligence
caused the (injury) (damages) (losses). You will express that decision
in the form of percentages. The percentage of the plaintiff's negli-
gence plus the percentage of the defendant's negligence must total one
hundred percent. The court cautions you not to assume that because
Question 5 is given to you or because Question 5 includes a space in
which to indicate negligence percentages for both the plaintiff and the
defendant that you must place some percentage of negligence in each
place. The negligence may range from zero percent to one hundred
percent as to each party; this is your decision as the jury.
If your answer to both Questions 1 and 2 is "yes," then you must
answer Question 6. Question 6 requires you to decide, by the greater
weight of the evidence, the total amount of (injury) (damages) (losses)
that the plaintiff sustained, regardless of the precise role of any negli-
gence of the particular parties in causing those damages. I (have in-
structed) (will instruct) you on the subject of damages.
222. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 14, § 17.4, at 302-04 (citing Visconsin's detailed set
of special verdict questions).
223. These special verdict questions are based on the forms used in Colorado. See
id.' at 304-05.
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b. The Six Basic Special Verdict Questions
The following basic questions provide the necessary framework for
a comparative negligence assessment by the jury. If the percentages in
Question 5 do not add up to one hundred percent, the judge should
reinstruct the jury and ask them to answer Question 5 again.
QUESTION NO. 1: Was the defendant, , negligent? (Answer
yes or no)
ANSWER NO. 1: -
QUESTION NO. 2: Was the defendant's negligence, if any, a proxi-
mate cause of the plaintiff's claimed (injuries) (damages) (losses)?
(Answer yes or no)
ANSWER NO. 2: -
QUESTION NO. 3: Was the plaintiff, , negligent? (Answer
yes or no)
ANSWER NO. 3: -
QUESTION NO. 4: Was the plaintiff's negligence, if any, a proximate
cause of (his) (her) (its) claimed (injuries) (damages) (losses)? (An-
swer yes or no)
ANSWER NO. 4: -
QUESTION NO. 5: If you have answered "yes" to all of the first four
questions, then you are to answer this question:
Taking the combined negligence that proximately caused the (in-
juries) (damages) (losses) as one hundred percent, what percentage of
that negligence was attributable to the defendant and what percent-
age was attributable to the plaintiff?
ANSWER NO. 5:
Percentage of combined negligence attributable to the defendant:.-%
Percentage of combined negligence attributable to the plaintiff:.%
TOTAL:
100%
QUESTION NO. 6: If you have answered Questions 1 and 2 "yes,"
state the amount of (injury) (damages) (losses), if any, sustained by
the plaintiff and proximately caused by the negligence of the defend-
ant. In determining this amount, do not consider the negligence of the
plaintiff, if any.
ANSWER NO. 6: $
These six special verdict questions lay the foundation for any com-
parative negligence system. After the jury answers these questions, the
judge can use the answers to Questions 5 and 6 to compute the plain-
tiff's share of recovery.
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c. The Role of the Jury
The jury will be aware of the impact of its decision on relative
percentages of negligence if the court uses a general verdict, but may
not have the same awareness if the court uses special verdict charges or
interrogatories. Consequently, with special verdicts or interrogatories,
the court must determine whether to tell the jury that the plaintiff's
recovery will be reduced by the plaintiff's percentage of negligence and
that if the plaintiff's percentage of negligence exceeds the defendant's,
then the plaintiff will not recover anything.
Many states believe that the judge should not tell the jury the ef-
fect of its decision on percentages.22 The basis for this prohibition is
to ensure that the jury considers only relevant matters. A particular
concern is that a sympathetic jury might adjust percentages or dam-
ages so that the plaintiff will get a larger recovery than deserved under
the comparative system.
The opposite view, apparently espoused by the more recent cases,
statutes, and commentary, takes the position that the jury should be
told of the effect of its verdict.2 25 One reason for this view is that in a
modified system it is wasteful for the jury to spend considerable time
determining the amount of damages and the exact percentage of plain-
tiff's negligence if that percentage exceeds fifty percent.22 6 Another ra-
tionale for the view that the jury should be told of the effect of its
verdict is that the process of determining percentages of fault is so in-
exact that precise figures will usually be speculative and arbitrary.
Consequently, the jury should fully understand the impact of its deci-
sion so that it will not casually determine that a plaintiff's share of
negligence is fifty-one percent. Given the inherent inexactness of the
decision and the harsh impact of the modified system when the plain-
tiff's negligence is greater than fifty percent, the court should allow the
jury to utilize its sense of responsibility and fairness in determining
percentages. Moreover, telling the jury the ultimate effect ensures
equal treatment by all juries because some jurors may already know
the effect. Finally, the trial court can set aside the jury's verdict if it
concludes that the verdict was the result of misunderstanding, sympa-
thy, or bias.227 Thus, although informing the jury of the effect of its
verdict sometimes may be unfair to the defendants because of possible
224. See id. § 17.5; HENRY WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT § 18.2 (2d ed. 1987); Stuart
F. Schaffer, Comment, Informing the Jury of the Legal Effect of Special Verdict An-
swers in Comparative Negligence Actions, 1981 DuKE L.J. 824.
225. SCHWARTZ, supra note 14, § 17.5, at 313; WOODS, supra note 224, § 18.2, at 423.
226. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 14, § 17.5, at 312.
227. See Roman v. Mitchell, 413 A.2d 322, 327 (N.J. 1980) (urging ultimate outcome
charge and setting requirements to overturn verdict).
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sympathy for the plaintiff, the currently preferred approach is to in-
form the jury of the effect of its decision.
228
If the court determines that the jury should be informed of the
effect of its determination, the following portion of the charge may be
used.
If you find by a greater weight of the evidence that the plaintiff's
negligence directly and proximately caused (his) (her) (its) own (in-
jury) (damages) (losses) and that (his) (her) (its) negligence was more
than fifty percent, the plaintiff will receive no recovery. If you find
that the plaintiff's negligence was fifty percent or less, I will compute
any (injury) (damages) (losses) by applying the percentages you find
to the plaintiff's total (injury) (damages) (losses). I will reduce the
plaintiff's (injury) (damages) (losses) by (his) (her) (its) percentage of
negligence. This computation will be done by me, and I will do the
computation after you complete the questions.
2. General Verdict Instruction
If the court decides not to use special verdict questions or inter-
rogatories, the following general verdict charges may be useful. Because
the jurors need to consider carefully the comparative computation, the
court should consider giving the jury a written copy of this portion of
the charge.
229
It is your duty to determine whether the plaintiff or the defend-
ant was negligent and whether the negligence on the part of either or
both was a proximate cause of the damages sought in this action. You
will make these determinations based on the greater weight of the
evidence.
If the defendant was not negligent or if any negligence of the de-
fendant was not a proximate cause of any injury to the plaintiff, you
should return a verdict for the defendant.
If you find that the defendant was negligent and that this negli-
gence was a proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff, you must then
consider whether the plaintiff was negligent.
If the plaintiff was not negligent or if (his) (her) (its) negligence
was not a proximate cause of any injury to the plaintiff, you must
return a verdict for the plaintiff.
If you determine that both the defendant and the plaintiff were
negligent and that the negligence of each was a proximate cause of
injury to the plaintiff, then you must determine the relative share of
228. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 14, § 17.5, at 313.
229. See AMIRAM ELWORK ET AL., MAKING JURY INsTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE 18-
20, 155 (1982) (discussing the increased jury understanding that results from written
instructions).
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the negligence of each in causing the injury.
If you find from all the evidence that the negligence of the plain-
tiff was greater than that of the defendant, 2 then you are instructed
that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover damages for his injuries.
However, if you determine from the evidence that the negligence
of the plaintiff was less than, or equal to, that of the defendant then
you should reduce the amount of damages you would otherwise award
to the plaintiff in proportion to the degree of negligence that is attrib-
utable to the plaintiff.
[At this point an example of proportional reduction might be
given with a clear and emphatic indication that the example is an il-
lustration only.]
3. Other Charges
The above charges, whether for special or general verdicts, should
be accompanied by the traditional instructions concerning negligence,
proximate cause,23 1 and damages. There is no reason to think that Nel-
son changes current law on these topics. Similarly, Nelson does not
appear to alter the current approach to pleading and burden of
proof.232 A plaintiff still will have to plead and prove that the defend-
ant was negligent and that this negligence proximately caused the
plaintiff's injuries.23 3 A defendant bears the burdens of pleading and
proving contributory negligence.2 3' The pattern charges presented
above address the burden of persuasion by requiring the jury to make
findings of negligence and proximate causation by the greater weight of
the evidence. Depending on the circumstances, it may be advisable to
give additional instruction concerning the burden of persuasion.
When multiple causes of action are involved, considerable care
may be required to ensure that comparative negligence is applied by
the jury only when appropriate. For example; if a products liability suit
is based on both negligence and strict liability, it will be necessary to
indicate that no comparison will be made in the strict liability claim if
these claims are excluded from the comparison.2 35 However, this will
not be much of a change from pre-Nelson practice because under the
230. If there are multiple defendants, the instructions should reflect that the plain-
tiff's negligence should be compared to all of the defendants combined. See Nelson v.
Concrete Supply Co., 303 S.C. 243, 245, 399 S.E.2d 783, 784 (1991).
231. For a discussion of possible analytical changes concerning proximate cause
when there are intervening wrongdoers, see supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
232. See ScHWARTZ, supra note 14, § 17.2.
233. HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 2, at 118-19.
234. Id. at 133.
235. For a discussion of whether strict liability for product defects will be included,
see supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
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former rules the jury would have been instructed that ordinary con-
tributory negligence is a complete defense to negligence but not to
strict liability.
238
It is not possible to draft any additional instructions or special
verdict questions until the issues about the exact form of comparative
system South Carolina will use under Nelson are addressed. The fol-
lowing sections address these issues.
C. Guidance for Determining Percentages
The inexact nature of comparative negligence determinations be-
comes clear when one attempts to develop guidelines for the jury to
use in determining percentages. The courts may determine that no
guidance should be given. If the courts determine, however, that guid-
ance would be helpful and proper, the following instruction is sug-
gested. An assumption underlying these instructions is that both par-
ties are negligent. It might be useful to remind the jury explicitly that
they may find that one or both parties were not negligent. All or some
of the items could be used. The introductory paragraph concerning the
role of the factors might be the subject of some dispute because it ar-
guably suggests to the jury that it has virtually unlimited discretion.
Some people might disagree with the wisdom or validity of this indica-
tion. However, discretion is necessary, and the jury also is told to con-
sider explicit factors and to make its decision on the basis of the facts
and law.
The conduct of the plaintiff or of the defendant may be more or
less negligent, depending upon all the circumstances. In order to assist
you in making this determination, I am going to give you a list of
factors to consider. However, I want to stress to you that the determi-
nation of whether there is any negligence and the determination of
the relative percentages of negligence, if any, is a matter for you alone
to decide. Depending on the circumstances of this case that you think
are important, you may use some, all, or none of the factors that I will
list for you. You also may consider any other factors that appear im-
portant to you in making this determination.
In determining the relative percentages of negligence of the plain-
tiff and the defendant, you may consider the following
circumstances237:
(1) whether the conduct was merely inadvertent or whether it
was engaged in with an awareness of the danger involved;
(2) the magnitude of the risk created by the conduct, including
236. See HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 2, at 252-54.
237. See generally UNIF. CoMp. FAULT AcT § 2 cmt., 12 U.L- 48 (Supp. 1991) (pro-
viding factors useful in determining fault).
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the number of persons endangered and the potential severity of
the injury;
(3) the significance of the goal that the actor was seeking to at-
tain by the conduct and the need to achieve the goal in this
manner;
(4) the actor's superior or inferior capacities and abilities to re-
alize and eliminate the risk involved;
(5) the particular circumstances confronting the person at the
time the conduct occurred (such as the existence of an emer-
gency requiring a hasty decision)" 8 ;
(6) the relative closeness of the causal relationship of the negli-
gent conduct of the defendant and the harm to the plaintiff;
(7) whether the conduct engaged in by a particular party in-
volved a violation of a safety statute or regulation. [A descrip-
tion of requirements for violation of the statute or regulation
might be given here.]
No specific instructions are included about other relevant factors
because the applicability of these instructions depends upon the reso-
lution of substantive issues. Therefore, the following section sets forth
alternatives for providing specific instructions on recklessness, last
clear chance, and assumption of risk.
D. Substantive Issues
Determining whether to include certain types of conduct in com-
parative negligence instructions is a difficult task because the effect of
Nelson on these types of conduct is not clear. For example, will the
possible recklessness of the defendant be included in the Nelson com-
parison, or will it be considered separately pursuant to current doc-
trine? Because it is unclear how these issues will be resolved, alterna-
tive approaches for instructing the jury are set forth below.
1. Recklessness
If recklessness is involved in a negligence action, several alterna-
tive treatments are possible. At this time in the comparative negligence
evolution it is not clear which alternative will be used. Therefore, an
instruction for each alternative treatment is given below.
238. The parenthetical materials may be omitted if one is particularly concerned
with avoiding the possibility of a charge on the facts. This concern was first raised by
South Carolina Supreme Court Chief Justice Ness at a 1991 CLE seminar on compara-
tive negligence. J.B. Ness, "Instructing the Jury in a Comparative Negligence Case" in
Comparative Negligence in South Carolina 181, 193, n.3 (July 12, 1991) (CLE Materials,
South Carolina Bar, No. 91-25).
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Alternative One: Recklessness Included in Comparison
If this alternative is chosen, the following language could be added
to the general guidance given above.
In determining the percentages of negligence for the plaintiff and
the defendant, you should consider whether the plaintiff or the de-
fendant engaged in the conduct with an awareness or consciousness
that negligence was involved.
As an alternative to this charge, the jury might be instructed that if
the defendant was aware of the unreasonable nature of the risk while
the plaintiff was not, then the plaintiffs negligence is, as a matter of
law, not greater than the defendant's. The jury could be instructed
that the jury's sole role is to determine the negligence attributable to
the plaintiff, which must be less than or equal to fifty percent.
Alternative Two: Recklessness Not Included in Comparison
If this alternative is used, the current standard charge on reckless-
ness could be given. If the basic special verdict questions on compara-
tive negligence are given, the jury could be instructed not to answer
the special verdict questions if recklessness is involved. For example,
for situations that involve the recklessness of the defendant, the fol-
lowing instructions might be included at the end of the introductory
charge on the special verdict questions:
The plaintiff claims that the defendant was reckless. I have in-
structed you on the subject of recklessness. If you find that the de-
fendant was reckless and that this recklessness was a proximate cause
of the plaintiff's (injury) (damages) (losses), if any, then you need an-
swer only Question 6.
For situations that involve contributory recklessness, the following
instruction might be used:
The defendant claims that the plaintiff was reckless. I have in-
structed you concerning recklessness. If you find that the plaintiff was
reckless and that this recklessness was a proximate cause of the plain-
tiff's injuries, if any, then you must return a verdict in favor of the
defendant. In that case you need not answer any of the special verdict
questions.
Alternative Three: Recklessness Not Compared with Negligence,
But Recklessness and Contributory Recklessness Compared
If recklessness is viewed as being so different from negligence in
both kind and degree that a comparison between the two would be
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improper, then the doctrine differentiating between recklessness and
negligence would not change. However, a comparison of recklessness
and contributory recklessness would be consistent with the rationale of
Nelson. If the two are compared, the basic comparative negligence
charge could be revised by substituting the word "recklessness" for
''negligence."
2. Last Clear Chance
If the facts support a last clear chance charge, at least two alterna-
tives exist. It is not clear which alternative should be used.
Alternative One: Last Clear Chance Included in Comparison
If this alternative is used, the following might be considered in
addition to the general guidance instructions given above.
In determining the relative percentages of negligence for the
plaintiff and the defendant, you should consider, as a factor relevant
to the defendant's share of negligence, whether the plaintiff was in
peril and unable to extricate (himself) (herself) (itself) from the peril.
If the plaintiff was in peril, you also should consider whether the de-
fendant was aware of that peril and, if (he) (she) (it) was, whether the
defendant could have then avoided the injury to the plaintiff if the
defendant had used due care at that point.
As another option, the jury could be instructed that if the last clear
chance doctrine applies, then the plaintiff's negligence is, as a matter
of law, not greater than the defendant's and that the jury's sole role is
to determine the percentage of negligence attributable to the plaintiff,
which must be less than or equal to fifty percent.
Alternative Two: Last Clear Chance Not Included in Comparison
If this alternative is used, the standard charge for the last clear
chance doctrine would be given. If the basic special verdict questions
on comparative negligence also are given, it may be necessary to in-
struct the jury that the special verdict questions need not be answered
if last clear chance is applicable. For example, the following might be
included at the end of the introductory charge on the special verdict
questions.
The plaintiff claims that the defendant had the last clear chance
to avoid the injury. I already have instructed you on the subject of
last clear chance. If you find that the defendant had the last clear
chance of avoiding the injury you need answer only Question 6.
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3. Assumption of Risk
As with last clear chance, two alternatives are possible with as-
sumption of the risk, and it is not clear which alternative should be
followed. A plaintiff who is aware of the risk also may be contributorily
reckless, 239 thereby making a charge on recklessness appropriate under
some circumstances.
Alternative One: Assumption of Risk Included in Comparison
If this alternative is used, consider the following as an addition to
the general guidance given above:
In determining the relative percentages of negligence for the
plaintiff and the defendant, consider, as a factor relevant to the plain-
tiffs percentage of negligence, whether the plaintiff, knowing of the
nature and extent of the risk involved, voluntarily exposed (himself)
(herself) (itself) to the risk of the injury that occurred.2"
Alternative Two: Assumption of Risk Not Included in Comparison
If this alternative is used, the standard charge for assumption of
risk should be used. If the basic special verdict questions on compara-
tive negligence also are given, it may be necessary to inform the jury
that the special verdict questions need not be answered if assumption
of risk is applicable. For example, the following could be included at
the end of the introductory charge on the special verdict questions241:
The defendant claims that the plaintiff assumed the risk of the
injury. I instructed you on the subject of assumption of risk. If you
find that the plaintiff assumed the risk of the injury, render a verdict
for the defendant. In that case you need not answer the special verdict
questions.
XI. CONCLUSION
Nelson involves not only substantive issues of tort doctrine, but
also issues concerning the rule of courts in changing basic laws. Prece-
dent provides predictability, not rigidity, and rules should change
when needed. When change is needed, the questions are whether basic
239. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
240. This language overlaps somewhat with the first guideline. See supra text fol-
lowing note 237.
241. See supra text following note 223.
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change should come from the courts or the legislature and, if judicial
change is used, what is the best approach to overruling precedent.
The strengths and flexibility of judicial change are indicated in
Nelson by the use of prospective dictum as a technique for displacing
prior doctrine. The prospective approach provided the legislature with
an opportunity to reject comparative negligence or to adopt a general
scheme with details that could not be spelled out in a single judicial
decision. A prospective decision also was useful to permit restructuring
of insurance and other financial arrangements; Finally, the approach
gave the bar and lower courts time to shift to the new approach to
litigation. Prospective rulemaking also avoids the problem of an ex
post facto application of new and fundamentally different rules.
Adopting comparative negligence in dictum may appear contrary
to the notion that case law grows out of the holdings of decided cases.
However, judicial opinions cannot simply be divided in terms of hold-
ing and dictum. The distinction between holding and dictum is a mat-
ter of degree, and the explanation or rationale of the holding is often a
more important guide to the future behavior of courts than the essen-
tial but narrow statement that the court must make to dispose of the
issue before it. Moreover, dictum plays an important role in the formu-
lation of doctrine because it can deal with problems that have not yet
presented themselves to the court in the form of a dispute.
The opinion in Nelson also indicates the difficulty that common-
law courts face in using case-by-case adjudication to make systemic
changes. the legislature can adopt a general statute that addresses all
aspects of a broad scheme like comparative fault. The legislature also
can hold public hearings at which all viewpoints can be expressed and
problems and solutions can be explored. As indicated above, courts
have techniques like prospective dictum for making major changes in
law. They also have powers like imposing pattern jury charges. How-
ever, one reason these powers must be used sparingly is that courts
lack the ability to conduct pubic hearings on the merits of proposals
for systemic or fundamental change. Input for judicial action is usually
limited to the parties in the suit before the court. As a result, judicial
change tends to be incremental, rather than systemic.
Because of this need to proceed incrementally, Nelson requires
broad speculation about the range and effect of the decision. Taken
narrowly, the decision does nothing more than alter the defense of con-
tributory negligence in negligence cases in which the plaintiff's negli-
gence does not exceed that of the defendant or defendants. But, as this
Article has noted, even a narrow reading of Nelson brings into question
a wide range of doctrines, such as last clear chance, which function as
palliatives to the complete bar to recovery for injury caused by contrib-
utory negligence. The opinion also raises questions about the status of
assumption of risk, recklessness, duties to protect victims, and defenses
1992]
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to strict liability in tort. Thus, absent legislation, the details for the
South Carolina scheme will depend upon the case-by-case development
of common-law authority.
The experience of other states is too varied to permit accurate pre-
diction of the future of comparative negligence in South Carolina. The
survey undertaken in this Article can only review alternatives and sug-
gest possible approaches to issues raised by Nelson. Predictions of spe-
cific judicial developments are both difficult and unreliable. Neverthe-
less, if the development of comparative negligence is left to case law, it
is likely that it will comport with the approach of Nelson and the tra-
dition of common-law decision making. Development will be gradual
and incremental.
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TABLE 1: Initial Adoption of Comparative Negligence Systems
Method of Initial Adoption Type of System
stt.No Comparative Modfe (A) Modified (5)
Jdcl___Nggni Equal L_. Titan
Alabama X
x x
Arizona X X
Arkansas x XS AX
Colorado X X
Connecticut X X
Delaware X X
D. C. X
Horida X X
Georgia x x
Hawaii X X
Idaho X X
Illinois X X
Indina
Iowa X X
Kansas X
Kentucky X X
Louisian X X
Maine X X
Maryland X
Massachusetts A X
Michigan xx
Minnesota X
Mississippi X x
Missouri x X
MoAn X
Nebraska X X
Nevada X X
New Hampshire X X
New Jersey X X
New Mexico X X
New York X X
North Carolina X
North Dakota X X
Ohio X X
Oklahoma X X
Oregon X X
Pennsylvania X 
X
Rhode Island X 
X
South Carolina X 
X
South Dakota X 
X
Tennessee 
X
Texas X X
Utah X X
Vermont X X
Virginia X
Washington X A
West Virginia X x
x
Wyoming X X
Totl: 12 33 6 16 13 16
% of Tolah 23.5% 64.7% 11.% 31.4% 25.5% 31.4%
Not= This table stanmarins only onm aspect of the doctrine or oparative ne.ipsn etae sod aroanle ionnaion about he ofteo stte
dietios among the saes polirs requires refere to fte rited authonties. S Table I NoteL.
Peepsmpd by, Eileen S. Gitbeme
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TABLE 1: NOTES
State Note
Alabama The Alabama Supreme Court recently declined to adopt the doctrine of comparative negligence. Knight v.
Alabama Power Co., 580 So. 2d 576 (Ala. 1991).
Alaska Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1049 (Alaska 1975).
Arizona Originally enacted 1984. 57B AMu. ls. 2O Neligence § 1311, at 199,201 (1989); HENRY WOODS.
CoMMstAova' FAULT § 1:11, at 27 (2d ed. 1987).
Arkansas Originally enacted in 1955. 57B AM. JtnR. 2D Negligence § 1322 (1989); WooDS, supra, at 29.
California I v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1243 (Cal. 1975) (en bane).
Colorado Originally enacted 1971. 57B A. Ju. 2O Negligence § 1343, at 224 (1989); see WoonS, supra, at 29.
Connecticut Originally enacted 1973. 57B Am. Jut. 2o Negligence § 1355 (1989); Woons, upra, at 26.
Delaware Originally enacted 1984. Culver v. Bennett, 588 A.2d 1094,1098 (DeL 1991); 57B AM. Jit. 2O Negligence
§ 1363 (Supp. 1991).
D, C. Slight/gross comparison is made for injuries of employees of common canrie. 57B AM. Jto. 2D Negligence§ 1364 (19S'9).
Florida Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431,437 (Fla. 1973).
Georgia The Supreme Court of Georgia recognized comparative negiigence early in this century when it conbinedtiss priniciple of a atatute that provided for a reduction in damsaces for a negligent plaintiff tojured in
raiod operatina with another atatute which provided that a dlefendant is not relieved from liability if a
plaintiff is ontbutorily negligent. VIhr. E. S t stiz Co 
. ctva Neot o c § 1.4(B), at 1,§ 1.(A),
at 16 (2ded. 196).
Hawaii Originally enacted 1969. 57B AM. Ju. 2o Negligence § 1388, at 251 (1989).
Idaho Originally enacted 1971. 57B AM Jut. 2o Negligence § 1396, at 253 (1989); WooDs, supra, at 30.
Illinois Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886 (In. 1981).
Indiana Originally enacted 1983. 57B AM. Jut 2o Negligence § 1418, at 265 (1989); WOODS. supra, at 29.
lowa Goctzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1982).
Kansas Originally enacted 1974.57B AM. Jbt. 2o Negligence § 1437, at 280 (1989); WooDs, sUpra, at 30.
Kentucky Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984).
Louisiana Originally enacted 1979. 57B A?& bs. 2o Negligence § 1460, at 295 (1989); WoODS, spra, at 27.
Maine Originally enacted 1965. 57B AM. Jtr. 2o Negligence § 1471, at 302-03 (1989); WooDS, supra, at 30.
Mar)land Outterman v. Biggs, 240 A.2d 260 (Md. 1968).
Masschusetts Originally enacted 1969. 57B AM. JtR. 2D Negligence § 1483, at 308 (1989).
Michigan Plack v. City of Sterling Heights, 275 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. 1979).
Minnesota Originally enacted 1969.57B AM. Jt. 2o Negligence § 1503, at 317 (1989).
Milssippi Originally enacted 1910.57 AM. Jt. .2o Negligence § 1516, at 328 (1989) (Missisippi mint be accorded
the premier role in intitiating and developing comparative negligence in general tort actions."); Sciwtcrz,
supra, § 1.4(B), at 11.
Missouri Oustafson v. Bends, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983) (en bane).
Montana Originally enacted 1975. 57B AM Jtn. 2o Negligence § 1534, at 342 (1989); Woo, supra, at 29.
Nebraska Slightgross systam. Originally enacted in 1913. 57B Am Jt. 2o Negligence § 1543, at 347 (1989);
SciwARt, supra, § 1.4(B), at 12; WOoos, supra, at 29.
Nevada Originally enacted'1973. WOODS, supra, at 29.
New Hampshire Originally enacted 1969. 57B AM. Jtn. 2D Negligence § 1560, at 353 (199); Woos, supra, at 29.
New Jerey Originally enacted 1973. 57B AM. JtuR. 20 Negligence § 1570 (1989); WoOD, supra, at 29.
New Mexico Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234 (N.M. 1981).
New York Originally enacted 1975. 57B AM. Jut. 2o Negligence § 1591 (1989); Woos, supma, at 28.
North Carolina Comparative negligence applies to injured employees of railroads engaged in intrastate commerce.
57B As. Juit. 20 Negligence § 1602 (1989).
North Dakota Originally enacted 1973. 57 A,. Jut. 2o Negligence § 1603 (1989); WooDS, supra, at 30.
Ohio Originally enacted 1980. 5713 AM Jt 2o Negligence § 1614, at 384 (1989); Paul Courtney & Brian Dovi,
Note S.B. 165: Comparative Negligence in Oilo, 7 U. DAYtoN L RE. 257,257 (1981).
Oklahoma Originally enacted 1979. See 57B Am. Jt. 2o Negligence § 1624 (1989); WooDS, supra, at 29.
Oregon Originally enacted 1971. 57B AM. Jut. 20 Negligence § 1634, at 391 (1989).
Penylvania Originally enacted 1976. 57 AM. Ju. 2o Negligence § 1645 (1989).
Rhode Island Originally enacted 1971. 57 AM. Jt. 20 Negligence § 1656 (199); WooDs, supra, at 29.
South Carolina Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 399 S.E.2d 783 (S.C. 1991).
South Dakota Slthtr' setem. Originally enacted 1941.57h AM. Ji. 20 Negligence § 1665 (1989); ScwARTz, supra,
§ P;4( at(A on?2.
Tenn.s=e Although It is sometimes said that Tennessee has judicially adopted a form of comparative negligence, the
Tennessee doctrine is 'far from a general comparative negligence approac." SctAw.va2, supra, 8l5(A),
at 17.
Texas Originally enacted 1973. 57B Am. etR. 20 Negligence § 1675, at 408 (1989); Woos, supra, at 29.
Utah Originally enacted 1973. WooDs, supra, at 30; see 57B AM. Jt. 20 Negligence § 1686 (1989).
Vermont Originally enacted 1969. 57B Am. JtR. 20 Negligence § 1697 (1989); Wools, supra, at 29.
Virginia Comparative negligence apples to injured employees of railroads engaged in intrastate commerce.
57B Am. kit. 2o Negligence § 1706 (1989).
Washington Originally enacted 1981,57B Akt. Jt 20 Negligence § 1707, at 424 (1989); WooM, supra, at 28.
West Virginia Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979).
Wisconsin Originally enacted 1931. ScswAwz, supra, § 1.4(B), at 12; see 57B Am. Jit. 20 Negligence § 1728 (1989).
Wyoming Orignally enacted 1973. 57B A.. Just. 20 Negligence § 1742 (1989): Woons. supu. at 30.
t'epandby: Eilee S. Oitlies
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TABLE 2: Current Status of Comparative Ne igence Systems
No Endltoi~s Arabelt
oop-lt = . E.
S91t. Nqft o P- r- ThoL.o _bl _ _r_ _
Alabatra X S71 AM. J313 2D Negligertr § 1300 (1989).
Alaska X X ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.09 (Syp. 1991).
Arizoa X X AR.IZONA REV. SIAT. ANN. 6 12-2505 (Sup. 1991).
Arkansas X X ARK CODE ANN. 1664.-122 (Michi Supp. 1991).
Cahfomia X X liv. Yellow Cab Co.. 532 P.2d 1226 (Cl. 1975) (en bal.
Colorado X X COlo. EV. SIAT. t 13-21-111 (1997).
Coonecticut X X CON . GEM STAT. ANN. j 2.-72(h) (West 1991).
Delaware X X DEL- CODS ANN. ti. 10. § 8132 (Sp. 1990).
D. . X 57B11 . JUR. 2D N geC § 1364 (1969).
Florida X X FLA STAT. ANSI. eb. 768.81 (Ha.isco 1994).
Oeoegta ____ X G A. ODS ANN. § 51.12.33 (Micbie Soyp. 1991).
Hawaii X X HAW. REV. SrAT. § 66331 (195).
Idaho _IAXHOX 060D0 § 6-901 (1990).
Ilinois X X IL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110. Pam 2-1107.1 (Stith.HrdS pp. 1991).
x .... X IND. CODE AR-4. § 344-33-3 to .4 (Burs 1986).
Iowa X X IOWA CODE AN. 6 619.17 (West Sum 1991).
Lanss X X KAN. STAT. ANN. j 60-258& (1983).
Kentucky X X Hiloe v. Hays. 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1964).
Loeosi-n X X LA. CV. COD ASN. art. 2323 (West Soyp. 1991).
Maine X X ME. REv. STAT. AlN. tit. 14, § 56 (West 1964).
Maryland X 57B A. JuR. 2D Ngligence § 1482 (199).
Massachsetts x X MASS. GEN. IAAS ANN. oh. 231.6638 (West 1983).
9.ichip X X P1o1 V. Cty of Stelin Heighs. 275 N.W2d 511 (Micb. 1979).
Mino X X MllN. STAT. ANN. § 604.1 (Wo 19 & Sop. 1992).
Mostpi X N.1 MI. CODS ANN. 11.715 (1972).
Misouri X X Guotafioo v. Broda. 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1913) (to ban*)
Monta a X X MO. CODS AN. § 27.1792( 1991).
Nebraska X X NE& REV. STAT. 6 2S-21. llg( 19 9) (silh gnrowl
Nov.&0 X x NEV. R1EV. STAT. ANN. § 41.141 (Micbie Soyp. 1991).
Now . otyhio X X NIH. RE!V. STAT. AlOE § SU7L7U (Soyp. 1991).
No. Jersty x X NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A.13..1 (West 1957)
New Modio X X Scott v. Ric. 634 P.26 1234 (N.M. 1981).
New York X X N.Y. CIV. AC. L & R. 1411 (Mclioy 176).
North Cacoo X 3TB AM. 31 .2D Negligence 1603 (1939).
Nort Dakota X X N.D. CU. CODE § 32-032 (Sup. 1991).
Ohio X X 0HI0 REV. CODE ANO I 2313.19 (Anderson 1991).
Oklaho. X X OKLA. STAT. AN. ti .23. § 13 (W t 1917).
00"-500 X X OR. REV. STAT. § 18.470 (1993).
Peoosymmoia, X X 42 PA. CDSK STAT. ANN. j 7102(a) (1912).
Rhode Island X X I.L GEN. LAS § 9-2-4 (19&5).
South Carolina X X Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co. 399 SE.2d 713 (S&C 1991).
Sooth Dakota X X S.D. CODrED LAV.S ANN. § 20-9-2 (1917) (oe9t/gr/s).
Testcscce X 571 A. J1 0.20 Neglgezw §1674 (1989).
Teoas X X 37M0 CiV. PAC. & RLM. CODS ANN. 633.001 (West Sopp. 1991).
Utah X X UTrA COOS ANN. § 7-27.3 (1953).
Verotont x X VT. STAT. ANN. tit.12.619136 (1990).
viotai- x S3,AM . 92D Negliger~nr j1706 (19091
Woigot X X WASH. REV. CODS ANN. 6 422.93 (West 198).
Wes Virgia X X Braey v. Appalachian Powr Co. 256 SE.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979).
WoooooosL X X WMt STAT. ANN. 953.045 (Woot 1913).
W)-oilg X X WYO. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1983).
TotL: 51 6 13 21 11 7 30
% 010 1.8% 25.3% 41.2% 21.5% 13.7% 74.S%
_________ 20.9 4&.7% 24&4% t&6% 044% _____________________________
Note: Thls table Sooooa.ireS only oe aspect of the doctrine of omparoti oeolgttt
COooleto 0080000010 information about the often subtl dtstiooo omoog 0.
-tat pohieeo oeqi re reoc to the citd authoritis.
Peepseod by. Eloe S. Gitbeo
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TABLE 3: State-by-State Analysis of Comparative Negligence Systems
______ A. a Q. NM
Am5BCWM of Compwath. Neatpa. To
Stu.
P-. L-.Thot lb-. Y. No V. N. NO
Alaska X X X . X
Arizoa X X X X
Arkansas X X X X
Califrnia X X. X. X
Colorado _ _ X X I X I I. X
Connecticut X X* X. . X
Delaware X X X X
Florida X X X X
- -m X __ X X X
Hawaii X X X X
Idaho X X ___ X
loil X X X. X
Indiana X X X,_, X
Iowa X X X X
Kansas X X. X X
lintuk X X X X
Louisiana X - - X. _ X
Maine X ,X X_ X
Massachusetts X X* , _,, X
M'"hlfn X X X. X ,
Minnesota X X X* X
Misouri X X X
Montana X ,X X
Nebraska X , X X
Nevada X -- X X X
New Hampshi X" X X
New, rsey X .X X X
New Mexico X X X X
New York X X X X
North Dakota - .X X X X
Ohio X X X X
Oklahoma X X X X __
Oregn X X X , X-
Pennsylvania X X. I X X
Rhode Island X X
South Carolina X _ ......... __
South Dakota X X X
Texas X X X
Utah X X ___ X X
Vermont X X X
Washin X X x X ......
West Virini __X X X. X
Wisconsin X X* X. X
WyomigX X X X
ToW t,,.tk Datr 13 21 11 39 5 32 9 19 17
Patb 29% 47% 24% I % 11.4% 78% 22% 52.8% 47.2%
Note Tk table a area a a a h t e a of oocptrei " aegli coapltc sad a*e cata
Nm tacim £b-td the ots L0ef dcaite d x ln& ong the stee poloa ra e. r.feence to the
dtod altomL= See Table 3 Note.
Aotar (cepti= Wcated:Im aotcs. Prepared b _. EiffeoS. eites
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TABLE 3: NOTES
State CoL Note
Alaska A ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.060 (Supp. 1991).
B Leavitt v. Gillaspie, 443 P.2d 61, 69 (Alaska 1968).
C ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.900 (Supp. 1991); Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1050 (Alaska 1975).
D ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.900 (Supp. 1991.
Arizona A ARML REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2505 (Supp. 1991).
R Id.
C Dykeman v. Engelbrecht, 803 P.2d 119,121-22 (Ariz. CL App. 1990).
D ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2505 (Supp. 1991).
Arkansas A ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-12 (Michic Supp. 1991).
B Simmons v. Frazier, 642 S.W.2d 314, 316-17 (Ark. 1982).
C Chism v. Phelps, 311 S.W.2d 297, 298 n.1, 300 (Ark. 1958).
D Fault to be compared 'includes any act ... which is a proximate cause of any damages sustained
by any party." ARM. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122(c) (Michie 1987).
California A 1i v. Yellow Cab Co, 532 P.2d 1226, 1243 (Cal. 1975) (en bane).
B Id. at 1240-41.
C Id. at 1240.
D The California Supreme Court has not rul definitively on this issue, but has noted that "[ilt has
been persuasively argued, however, that the lms of deterrent effect that would occur upon
application of comparative fault concepts to willful and wanton misconduct as well as ordinary
negligence would be slight.' Id. at 1241. The California Court of Appeal has not decided this
issue consistently. Compare Trenier v. California Inv. & Dev. Corp, 164 Cal. Rptr. 156 (CL
App. 1980) (holding that willful misconduct bars recovery) with Sorensen v. Allred, 169 Cal.
Rptr. 441 (Ct App. 1980) (holding that comparative negligence is to be applied to willful
misconduct of either party).
Colorado A COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1987).
B Id. § 13-21-111.7.
C Burns v. OttatL, 513 P.2d 469,472 (Colo. CL App.), cert. denied, 513 P.2d 469 (Colo. 1973).
D "[The statute requires the comparison of each party's fault irrespective of whether such fault is
attributable to simple negligence, gross negligence, or willful and reckless negligence." G.E.C.
Minerals, Inc. v. Harrison W. Corp, 781 P.2d 115,116 (Clo. CL App.), cert. denied, 781 P.2d
115 (Colo. 1989).
Connecticut A CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572(h)(b) (West 1991).
B Id. § 52-572h([).
C Id.
D Comparative negligence 'dcs not apply to claim of wilfull [sic, wanton, or recless misconduct.'
Smith v. Margasitaville, No. 51-53-94, 1991 WL 88438 (Cone. Super. Ct. May 16, 1991) (mere.).
Delaware A DEL. CODE ANN. tit 10, § 8132 (Supp. 1990).
B Fell v. Zimath, 575 A.2d 267 (Del. Super. CL 1989).
C Showell v. Atkins, 483 A.2d 1113 (Del. Super. CL 1984).
D "Contributory negligence is not a defense to wanton conduct." Stasts v. Lawrence, 576 A.2d 663,
668 (Del. Super. CL) (citing Wagner v. Shanks, 194 A.2d 701, 707 (Del. Super. CL 1963)), aJJ'd,
582 A.2d 936 (Del. 1990).
Florida A FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 768.81(2) (Harrison 1984).
B Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287, 290 (Fla. 1977) (holding that assumption of risk is evaluated
under principles of comparative negligence, except with respect to express assumption of risk,
which is a contractual concept).
C Beltran v. Waste Management, Inc., 414 So. 2d 1145, 1146 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1982) (per
curiam), review denied, 427 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 1983).
D Willianms v. Bumpass, 568 So. 2d 979, 982 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1990) (holding that comparative
negligence does not apply when defendant's negligent conduct was wanton or in reckles disregard
of its injurious coasequences).
Georgia A GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-33(a) (Michie Supp. 1991).
B Hull v. Merck & Co, 758 F.2d 1474, 1476-77 (11th Cir. 1985), cited in 57B AM. JuR. 2D
Negligence § 1381 (1989).
C Southern Ry. v. Brunswick Pulp & Paper Co, 376 F. Supp. 96,105 (S.D. Ga. 1974).
D 'It is well-settled that the defenses of comparative negligence ... and contributory negligence are
not valid defenses to intentional, wilful, or wanton and reckless torts....' Hopkins v. First
Union Bank, 387 S.E.2d 144,146 (Ga. CL App.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 387 S.E.2d 144
(Ga. 1989).
Hawaii A HAw. REV. STAT. § 663-31 (1988).
B See Geldert v. State, 649 P.,d 1165,1171 (Haw. CL App. 1982) (citing Bulatao v. Kauai Motors,
Ltd., 406 P.2d 887 (Haw. 1965)).
C No data. See 57B AM. JUR. 2D Negligence §1390 (1989) (citing Silva v. Olahi, 471 P.2 $Z4
(Haw. 1970)).
D See Gedert, 649 P.2d at 1171 (holding that comparative negligence principles apply to gross
negligence).
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TABLE 3: NOTES
State COL Note
Idaho A IDAHO CODE § 6-801 (1990).
B Salinas v. Vierstra, 695 P.2d 369, 374 (Idaho 1985) (holding that 'assumption of risk is no longer
available as an absolute bar to recovery unless the plaiif, either in writing or orally, expressly
assumes the risk involved).
C See Johnson v. Clearwater Stage Line, Inc., 529 P.2d 1261, 1263 a. (Idaho 1974) (noting that
the last clear chance doctrine is at issue because the cause of action arose before the adoption of
comparative negligence).
D No data. See 57B AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 1399 (1989).
Illinois A ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1107.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991).
B Barrett v. Fritz, 248 N.E.2d 111 (II. 1969) (holding that assumption of risk is confined to those
situations involving persons who have a contractual or employment relationship with the
defendant).
C Alvis v. Rihar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 898 (111. 981).
D Burke v. 12 Rothschild's LUquor Mart, Inc., 568 N.E.2d 80 (EI. App. CL) (holding that defendant
who was found guilty of willful and wanton misconduct was not entitled to a reduction in the
amount of liability based on the plaintif's simple negligence), appeal denied, 575 N.E.2d 912
(Il.), denial order vacated sub noa. Burke v. City of Chicago, 575 N.E.2d 1234 (IL.), appeal
granted sub nom. Burke v. 12 Rothchild's Liquor Mart, Inc., 580 N.E.2d 109 (i. 1991).
Indiana A IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-3 to -4 (Burms 1986).
B Id. § 34-4-33-2(a).
C Id.
D Id.
Iowa A IOWA CODE ANN. § 619.17 (West Supp. 1991).
B Id. § 668.1.1 (West 1987) (stating that the fault to be compared includes *unreasonable
assumption of risk not constituting an enforceable express consct').
C Id.
D Id.
Kansas A KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-28(a) (Supp. 1990).
B Jackson v. City of Kansas City, 680 P.2d 877,898 (Kan. 1984) (holding that assumption of risk is
an absolute defense only when it is based "upon the express or implied agreement of the
employee that, keowing the danger to which he is exposed, he agrees to assume all responsibility
for injuries resulting from his employment") (quoting Uhlrig v. Shott, 397 P.2d 321, 325-26
(Ian. 1964)).
C See Marshall v. Gilbert Central Corp, 763 P.2d 17 (Kan. 1988) (mem.) (per criam) (unpublishd
opinion).
D Bowman v. Doherty, 686 P.2d 112 (Kan. 1984).
Kentucky A Hden v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984).
B Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d 586,592-93 (Ky. 1967).
C Hilen, 673 S.W.2d at 718.
D KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.182(2) (Mlchie/Bobbs-Merill Supp. 1990) (stating that trier of fact
should consider 'nature of the conduct of each party'); see also Hilen, 673 S.W.2d at 718 (stating
that comparative negligence applies "regardless of contributory negligence such as in cases
involving ... defendant's willful or wanton negligence').
Louisiana A LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2323 (West Supp. 1991).
B Murray v. Ramada Ins, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123 (La. 1988) (stating that comparative negligence
statute abrogated assumption of risk).
C Watson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co, 469 So. 2d 967, 974 (La. 1985).
D No data. See 57B AM. JUM. 2D Negligence § 1463 (1989).
Maine A ME. REV. STAT. ANN. it. 14, § 156 (1964).
B Wilson v. Gordon, 354 A.2d 398 (Me. 1976).
C Cushman v. Perkins, 245 A.2d 846 (Me. 1968).
D ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (1964) (stating that comparative negligence appies to any 'ect
or omission which gives rise to a liability in tort'); see 57B Am. JU. 2D Negligence § 1474 (1989).
Massachusetts A M.sM. GEN. LAVAs ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West 1985).
B Id.
C No data. See 57B Am. JuR. 2 Negligence §1488(1989).
D See Lan v. Meserve, 482 N.E.2d 530, 532-33 (Mass. CL App.) (applying to compensatory but
not punitive damages), review denied, 485 N.E.2d 188 (Mass. 1985).
Michigan A Phcek v. City of Sterling Heights, 275 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. 1979).
B Feigner v. Anderson, 133 N.W.2d 136 (Mich. 1965).
C Callesen v. Grand Truck WJLR., 437 N.W.2d 372,377 (MIch. CL App. 1989).
D LaCroix v. Grand Track W.LR., 152 N.W.2d 656 (Mich. 1967).
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TABLE 3: NOTES
State CoL Note
Minnesota A MIrN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01(1) (West Supp. 1992).
B The type of fault to be compared includes 'unreasonable assumption of risk not constituting an
express consenL' Id. § 604.01(la).
C See id.
D Id. (stating that comparative negligence is to be applied to 'acts or omissions that are in any
measure negligent or reckless toward the person or property of the actor or others').
Mississippi A MIs. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972).
B Braswell v. Economy Supply Co, 281 So. 2d 669, 677 (Miss. 1973).
C Mississippi Cent. R.R. v. Aultman, 160 So. 737 (Miss. 1935); see also Underwood v. Illinois CenL
R.R, 205 F.2d 61, 63 (5th Cir. 1953) (stating that the last clear chance doctrine applies in
Mississippi).
D Comer v. Gregory, 365 So. 2d 1212, 1214 (Miss. 1978) (considering plaintiffs willful acts as a
mitigating circutce).
Missouri A Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
B Id.; see also Love v. Park Lane Medical Ctr, 737 S.W.2d 720, 724-25 (Mo. 1987) (en bane)
(distinguishing betwean comparative fault and comparative negligence).
C Gustafson, 661 S.W.2d at 16.
D Love v. Park Lane Medical Ctr, 737 S.W.2d 720 (Mo. 1987) (en bane).
Montana A MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-702 (1991).
B Kopischke v. First Continental Corp, 610 P.2d 668, 687 (Mont. 1980).
C No data. See 57B AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 1538 (1989).
D Martel v. Montana Power Co, 752 P.2d 140, 143 (Mont. 1988).
Nebraska A NEn. REV. STAT. § 25-21, 185 (1989) (holding that slight negligence of plaintiff is not a bar when
defendant's negligence is gross in comparison).
B Sandberg v. Hoogensen, 266 N.W.2d 745, 749-50 (Neb. 1978).
C See Whitaker v. Burlington N, Inc, 352 N.W.2d 589,594 (Neb. 1984) (holding that application of
comparative negligence is not available to a party whose negligence continued to the time of the
accident).
D No data. However, the gross/slight comparison does not obviate the defense of contributory
negligence. 57B AM. JU. 2D Negligence § 1547 (1989).
Nevada A NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.141(1) (Michie Supp. 1991).
B Mizushima v. Sunset Ranch, Inc., 737 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Nev. 1987) (holding that except for
express assumption of risk, the comparative negligence statute abolished assumption of risk as an
absolute defense).
C Davies v. Butler, 602 P.2d 605, 613 (Nev. 1979).
D Id. at 611.
New Hampshire A N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-d (Supp. 1991).
B England v. Tasker, 529 A.2d 938, 940 (N.H. 1987) (noting that doctrine has 'little vitality').
C Hanson v. N.H. Pre-Mix Concrete, Inc., 268 A.2d 841 (N.H. 1970).
D No data
New Jersey A NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West 1987).
B Assumption of risk is "so apt to create mist that it is better banished from the scene. We hope
we have heard the last of it.' McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co, 196 A.2d 238,240-41 (NJ.
1963) (per curiam); see also Mcistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, tar., 155 A.2d 90, 96 (NJ.
1959) (The question for the jury is whether the plaintiff failed "to use the care of a reasonably
prudent man.').
C Brennan v. Public Serv. Ry, 148 A. 775, 776 (NJ. 1930) (noting that the doctrine of last clear
chance is not recognized in New Jersey).
D Draney v. Bachman, 351 A.2d 409 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976).
New Mexico A Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234,1242 (N.M. 1981) (adopting opinion of Walters, Ct. App, J.).
B Id. at 1239.
C Id.
D Kabelta v. Bous.helie, 672 P.2d 290,292 (N.M. CL App. 1983), cited in 57B AM. JU. 2D
Negligence § 1584 (1989).
New York A N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 1411 (McKinney 1976).
B Id.
C 'Hoyt v. McCann, 450 N.Y.S.2d 231,232 (App. Div. 1982) (mem.).
D N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 1411 (McKinney 1976) (stating that comparative negligence is to be
applied to 'culpable conduct').
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TABLE - NOTES
State CoL Note
North Dakota A N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1991).
B See id. § 32-032-01.
C See Kleinjan v. Knutson, 207 N.W.2d 247,253 (N.D. 1973) (quoting Malcolm M. McIntyre, The
Rationale of Last Clear Chance, 53 HA,,. L REV. 1225, 1251-52 (1940)) (appearing to abl is
assumption of risk by stating: "Sufficient for today, and perhaps as a guide for tomorrow, we
quote .... 'Every vestige of last clear chance must be swept away in favor of apportionment").
D Ledford v. Klein, 87 N.W.2d 345,350-53 (N.D. 1957).
Ohio A OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19(A)(2) (Anderson 1991).
B Id.
C Mitchell v. Ross, 470 N.E.2d 245 (Ohio CL App. 1984).
D Payne v. Vance, 133 N.E. 85 (Ohio 1921).
Oklaomai A OKIA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 13 (West 1987).
B Id. § 12.
C See Lollar v. Elliott, 612 P.2d 1386, 1386 (Okla. CL App. 1980) (declining to apply last clear
chance doctrine and noting that party must 'almost prove wilful conduct').
D Amoco Pipeline Co. v. Montgomery, 487 F. Supp. 1268,1270-72 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
Oregon A OR. REV. STAT. § 18.470 (1988).
B Id. § 18.475 (abolishing implied assumption of risk).
C Id.
D DeYoutg v. Fallon, 798 P.2d 1114 (Or. CL App. 1990), resiew denied, 810 P.2d 854 (Or. 1991).
Peansylvanin A 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102(a) (1982).
B Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County Scr. Dist., 437 A.2d 1198, 1209 (Pa. 1981) (plurality
opinion) (appearing to abolish assumption of risk as an absolute defense by concluding that 'the
difficulties of using the term 'assumption of risk' outweigh the benefits'). Doctrine is not modified
as it pertains to downhill skiing. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7102(c) (1982).
C Spearing v. Starcher, 532 A.2d 36 (Pa. Super. CL. 1987) (holding that comparative negligence
statute abrogated is clear chance doctrine).
D Honeywell, Inc. v. American Standards Testing Bureau, Inc., 851 F.2d 652, 658 (3rd Cir. 1988)
(holding that a party may not rely on contributory negligence defense to its own wanton
mi.onduct), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1010 (1989).
Rhode Island A RJ. GENt. LAWS § 9-20-4 (1985).
B Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 376 A_2d 329 (R.I 1977).
C No data. See 57B AM. JUE. 2D Negligence § 1658 (1989).
D No data
South Carolina A Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 399 S.E.2d 783 (S.C. 1991).
B No data
C No data
D No data
South Dakota A S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1987) (making alight/gross comparison).
B See Bartlett v. Gregg, 92 N.W.2d 654,657 (S.D. 1958).
C Viach v. Wyman, 104 N.W.2d 817 (S.D. 1960).
D No data. See 57B AM. Jut. 2D Negligence § 1668 (1989).
Texas A TEX CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.001(a) (West Supp. 1991).
B Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751,758 (rex. 1975).
C French v. Grigsby, 571 S.W.2d 867 (rex. 1978) (per curiam).
D No data. See 57B AM. JUE. 2D Negligence § 1678 (1989).
Utah A UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-38 (1953).
B Id. § 78-27-37(2).
C Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591, 598 (Utah 1982).
D Ferguson v. Jongsma, 350 P.2d 404,408-09 (Utah 1960), cited in 57B AM. JUR. 2D Negligence
§ 1690 (1939).
Vermoat A VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1990).
B Sunday v. Stratton Corp., 390 A.2d 398 (VL 1978).
C McCrea v. State, 419 A.2d 318,320 n.2 (VL 1980) ("This assumes, without deciding, that the
doctrine of last clear chance has survived the adoption of comparative negligence in Vermont.').
D No data. See 57B A. JU. 2D Negligence § 1700 (1989).
Washington A WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.005 (West 1988).
B Id § 4.22.015.
C Id. § 4.22.005.
D Id. § 4.220L5.
West Virginia A Bradley v. Appalachiano Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979).
B King v. Kayak Mfg. Corp, 387 S.E.2d 511 (W. Va. 1989).
C Ratlief v. Yokum, 280 S.E.2d 584, 589 (W. Va. 1981).
D See King v. Kayak Mfg. Corp, 387 S.E.2d 511 (W. Va. 1989).
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State CoL Note
Wisconsin A Wi. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (1983).
B McConvlle v. State Farm MuL Auto. Ins. Co, 113 N.W.2d 14 (Wis. 1962).
C Switzer v. Detroit Inv. Co, 206 N.W. 407 (Wis. 1925) (refusing to recognize doctrine of last clear
chance prior to the adoption of comparative fault).
D Bielski v. Schlze, 114 N.W.2d 105,112-13 (Wis. 1962) (noting that gross negligence fulldlls no
purpose in comparative negligece).
Wyoming A WYO. STAT. § 1-1-109(a) (1988).
B Stephenson v. Pacific Power & Light Co, 779 P.2d 1169,1179-80 (Wyo. 1989).C IDancdlovkch v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187 (Wyo. 1979).
D Id.
Prepared by. Eiw S. Githeas
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Table 4: State-by-State Analysis of Comparative Negligence Systems and
Treatment of Multiple Defendants-Phantom Defendants
Consideration of Nonparty Tortfeasor
Plaintiff's Nejigence Compared to: In Determining Damags
State Al Defendants Nt Eirtt
Each Defendant Combined Yes No Settled
Alaska _" X
Arizona ______ ____ ___ X
Arkansas X X
Ca iforni, X
Colorado X X
Connecticut X X
Delaware .X X
lorida X
Georgia ______X ___ X
Hawaii X X
Idaho X X
ainsn X X
Indiana X X
Iowa X X
ansas X X
Kentucky X" X
,Louisana X
Maine X
Massachusetts X X
Micigan _ . ... X
Minnesota X X
Mlississipi ________x
Missouri X
Montana X X
Nebraska
Nevada X X
New X X
Hampshire
New Jersey X X
New Mexico
New York X
North Dakota X X
Ohio X X
Oklahoma X
OreonX X
Pennsylvania X X
Rhode Island X*
South X
Carolina
South Dakota
Texas X X
Utah X X
Vermont X X
Washington X.* X
West Virginia ..X X
Wisconsin X X
Wyoming X X
Total wth data: 4 28 4 16 10
Perrcent: 12., 87,S% 35 40% 25%
Not. This tbte emmises aspecss of the doctrine of cenpurative negligenc compcte and conrate information about the often
wbtin datncttots among the s=ese pohces requires efocence to the cited auhotitim. See Tabie 4 Notca.
Pate ysomP Pra-paredt a Eieen S. Gitbeno
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TABLE 4: NOTES
State Treatment of Multiple Defendants Treatment of Nonparty Tortfeasor
Alaska No data ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080 (Supp. 1991) (parties
joined and settled).
Arizona No data ARmZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506(B) (Supp.
1991) (all persons).
Arkansas ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-6
4
-122(a) (Michi Supp. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-64-122(a) (Michie Supp.
1991). 1991) (parties joined).
California No data American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court,
578 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1978) (en banc) (all persons).
Colorado Mountain Mobile Mix, Inc. v. Gifford, 660 P.2d COL. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.5 (1987 & Supp.
883 (Colo. 1983) (en banc). 1990) (all persons).
Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h(b) to CONN. GENN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h(b), 52-
-572h(c) (West Supp. 1991). 572h(n) (West 1991) (parties joined and settled).
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8132 (Supp. 1990). DE.. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8132 (Supp. 1990)
(parties joined).
Florida No data FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 768.81(3) (Harrison 1984)
(parties liable).
Georgia Union Camp Corp. v. Helmy, 367 S.E2d 796, Union Camp Corp. v. Helmy, 367 S.E.2d 796
800 (Ga. 1988). (Ga. 1988) (parties joined).
Hawaii HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-31 (1988). Espaniola v. Cawdrey Mars Joint Ventures, 707
P.2d 365,373 (Haw. 1935).
Idaho Ross v. Coleman Co, 761 P.2d 1169, 1182-83 Pocatello Indus. Park Co. v. Stell W, Inc., 621
(Idaho 1988). P.2d 399, 402-03 (Idaho 1930) (all persons).
Illinois ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1116 (Smith- ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1117 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1991). Hurd Supp. 1991)(all persons).
Indiana IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-4 (Bums 1986). IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-33-2, -4, -5 (Burns
1986) (all persons).
Iowa IOWA CODE ANN. § 6683 (West 1987). IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 668.3,668.7 (West 1987)
(parties joined and settled).
Kasa KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (Supp. 1990). KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-259a (Supp. 1990) (all
persons).
Kentucky No data KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.182 (Michic/Bobbs-
Merrill Supp. 1990) (parties joined and settled).
Louisan No data Garrett v. Safeco Ins. Co, 433 So. 2d 209 (La.
CL App. 1983).
Maine No data ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tiL 14, § 156 (1940)
(parties joined).
Massachusetts MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West MASS. GEN. LAMS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West
1985). 1985) (parties joined).
Michigan No data Mayhew v. Berrien County Rd. Comm, 326
N.W.2d 366 (Mich. 1982) (parties joined and
settled).
Minnesota Marier v. Memorial Rescue Serv., Inc., 207 Lines v. Ryan, 272 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. 1978)
N.W.2d 706 (Mon. 1973). (all persons).
Mississippi No data MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7(7) (Supp. 1991)
(parties joined).
Missouri No data Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.067 (Vernon 1988)
(parties joined).
Montana MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-702 (1991). MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-703(4) (1991).
Nebraska No data No data
Nevada NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.141 (Michie Supp. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.141(3) (Mchie
1989). Supp. 1989).
New Hampshire N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-d (Supp. 1992). N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-d (Supp. 1992)
(parties joined and settled).
New Jersey NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A.15-5.1 (West 1991). NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A.15-5.1 (West 1991)
..(parties joined).
New Mexico No data No data
1992]
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State Treatment of Multiple Defendants Treatment of Noaparty Tortfeavor
New York No data N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L & I. 1601 (McKimy Supp.
1992) (stating that generally, parties are joined
but culpable conduct of a person who is not a
party is not considered in apportionment of
damages as long as laiman can prove inability
to obtain jurisdiction over such person).
North Dakota NJ. CENrT. CODE § 32-032-02 (Supp. 1991). N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03201 (Supp. 1991).
Ohio OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19(A)(2) OIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19(D)(1)(C)
(Anderson 1991). (Anderson 1991) (parties joined).
Oklahoma ONLA. STAT. ANN. tiL 23, § 13 (West 1987). ChaI'm v. City of Tulsa, 664 P.2d 1026 (1983).
Oregon ON, REV. STAT. § 18.470 (1988). Conner v. Mertz; 548 P.2d 975 (Or. 1976) (en
bane).
Pennsylvania 42 PA. ConS. STAT. ANN. § 7102(a) (1982). 42 PA. CONS. SrAT. ANN. § 7102(b) (1982)
(parties joined).
Rhodc Island No data No data
South Carolina Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 399 S.E2d 783 No data
(S.C. 1991) (citing Elder v. Oduck, 515 A.2d 517
(Pa. 1976)).
South Dakota No data No data
Tess TEX, CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.001 TEX CIV. PRAC. & RES CODE ANN. § 33.003
(West 1986 & Supp. 1991). (West Supp. 1991) (parties joined and settled).
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-38 (1953). UTAHf CODE ANN. § 78-27-38 (1953) (parties
joined).
Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1990). VT. STAT. ANN. ti. 12, § 1036 (1990) (pastics
____________________ joined in same action).
Washington WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §422.070 (West 1988). WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.070(1) (West
1988) (parties released, settled, immune, or who
have prevailed on an individual defense).
West Virginia Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co, 256 S.E.2d Bowman v. Barnes, 282 S...2d 613, 621 (W. Va.
879 (W. Va. 1979). 1981) (all persons).
Wisconsin Wisconsin Natural Gas Co. v. Ford, Bacon & Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 252
Davis Cons.r. Corp., 291 N.W.2d 825,831-32 N.W. 721, 727 (WiS. 1934) (all persona).
(Ws. 1980).
Wyoming Board of County Comm'rs v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d Kirby Blg. Sys. v. Mineral Explorations Co,
1174, 1183-84 (Wyo. 1981). 704 P.2d 1266, 1272 (Wyo. 1985) (all perms).
P.pare b7- Eilea S. ftrha
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TABLE 5: State-by-State Analysis of Comparative
Negligence and Strict Products Liability
Apa9wdun or Co Noaatire to OoleWDtetMion t thbe AP &.0o of Coo.jn.t
Strict Prodoots thhlt, Negtigence to Strict hodod tJhllt
state Y. No Ottr j1.1dcal tLoat.
Alaska x x
Arizona X X
Arkansas X X
California X x
Colorado X X
Connecticut X x
Delaware No strict liability
Florida x X
Georgia x X
Hawaii X X
idaho x X
llinois X x
Indiana X X
Iowa X X
Ksnsas X X
Kentucky x x
Louisiana X X
Maine X X
Massachusetts X X
Michiga x x
Minnesota X X
Mississippi x x
Missouri X X
Montana X X
Nebraska X X
Nevada x X
New Hampshire X X
New Jersey X X
New Mesdco X X
New York X X
North Dakota X X
Ohio X X
Oklahoma x x
Oregon x X
Pennsylvania x X
Rhode Island _ X
South Carolina No data
South Dakota - x'TC x
Utah X X
Vermont X x
Washington X X
West Virginia X X
Wisconsin X X
Wyoming X X
Total with data: 43 33 10 2 22 21
% ith data. 77% 23% 51% 49%
Notc: Thi; tabte soocotari=r aspects or the docuriec or coutpaive orgipee ecteaaccurate iaforaatio about the oftea subtle dontintio acong the states poles
tequi.c r e reoe to the cited autbotiet See Table 5Notp Prepared byr. E, e e. Oithem
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TABLE & Notes
slot. Note
Alaka Comparativ negligence appliea to strict liability in tort, breach of warranty, and misuse of a product for
which the defendant would otherwise be liable. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.900 (Supp. 1991).'
Ariorir '[Cjontributory negligence, as distinguished from assumption of risk, is not a defense to a claim allegIng
strict liability in tort, including any product liability action... except claitms alleging ncgligence.
ARt. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2509(3) (Supp. 1991).
Arkansas Comparative fault includes 'any act, omission, conduct, risk assumed, breach of warranty, or breach of
any legal duty which is a proalmate cause of any damages sustained by any party.* APIL CODE ANN.
§ 16-64-122(c) (Michle Supp, 1991).
California Comparative fault is 'extrnded to actions founded on strict products liability.'
Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Cal. 1978).
Colorado Pure comparative fault applies to any actions for damages 'caused by or resulting from the manufacture,
construction, desIgn, formula, installation, preparation, assembly, testing, pacnkagi, labeling, or sale of
any product, or the failure to warn or protect against a danger or hamad in the use, misuse or
unintended use of any product, or the failure to provide proper instructions for the use of any produc'
COW0. REV. STAT. § 13-21-401(2) (1987); see iU. § 13-21-406.
Connecticut Comparative negligence is not a bar to recovery in actions based on strict tort liability. However, Its mse
is permitted for the 'defense of misuse of the product or the defense of knowingly using the product in a
defective condition in an action based on strict tort liability.' CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572() (West
1991).
Delaware Doctrine of strict liability In tort is not applicable in Delaware. Ciocola v. Delaware Coca-Cola Bottlin
Co., 172 A.2d 252 (Del. 1961).
Florida Comparative fault applies to actions for damages 'based upon theories of negligence, stri liability,
products liability,... or breach of warranty and like theories.1 FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 768.81 (Harrison
1984).
Georgia Comparative negligence does not apply to actions brought under the theory of strict liability, but the claim
of a plaintiff who unreasonably uses an obviously defective or dangerous product is barred. See Center
Chern. Co. v. Parzinl, 218 S.E.2d 580, 582.83 (Ga. 1975).
Hawaii Pure comparative negligence is applied to strict products liability. Han v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 733 P.2d
416,418-19 (Haw. 1987).
Idaho Comparative negligence does not bar recovery in a products liability action if the plaintiff's respomibility
was less than the defendant's. IDAHo CDE § 61304 (1990). Conduct that affects comparative
responsibility includes failure to observe an obvious defect, U § 6-1305(l)(b), voluntary use of a know
defective product, id. § 6-1305(2), and misuse or modification of the product, d. § 6-1305(3)-(4).
Illinois Comparative fault applies to strict products liability cases. Coney v. LG. Indus., 454 N.B.2d 197,202
(1lL 1983).
Indiana Comparative fault 'does not apply in any manner to strict liability actions ... or to breach of waranty
actions.' IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-13 (Burns 1986).
Iowa Comparative fault applies to strict tort liability and breach of warranty as well as unreasonable assumption
of risk, unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or mitigate damages, and misuse of a product for which
the defendant otherwise would be liable. IowA ConE ANN. § 66,1(1) (West 1987).
Kansas Comparative fault applies to strict tort liability, express or implied arranty, and failure to warn or
Instruct. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3302(c), 60-3305 (1987).
Kentucky Comparative negligence applies to 'all tort actions, including products liability actions.'
KY. REV. STAT. ANN § 411.182 (MicejBobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990).
Louisiana Comparative fault may be applied to strict products liability in some cases such as when the 'threat of a
reduction in recovery will provide consumers with an incentive to use a product carefully.' Bell v. Jet
Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166, 171 (La. 1985).
Comparative fault applies to strict products liability, but not to breach of waranty actions. Austin v.
Maine Raybestos.M- nbattan, Inc., 471 A.2d 280 (Me. 1984).
Massachusetts Comparative fault applies to products liability actions based on negligence, but not to breach of warrnty
actions. Colter v. Barber-Greene Co., 525 N.E.2d 1305 (Mass. 1988).
Michigan Comparative negligence applies to any products liability action based on any legal or equitable theory of
liability, Including those brought for design, manufacture, warning, and warranty. Karl v. Bryant Air
Conditioning Co., 705 F.2d 164, 165-66 (6th Cir. 1983).
Minnesota Comparative fault applies to actions based on strict tort liability. It alao applies to 'breach of warranty,
. smuse of a product and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages.' MmNN.
STAT. ANN. § 604.01(la) (West Supp. 1992).
Mi!sissppl Comparative negligence applin to produc~s Uablity'das. Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 512 F.2d
276, 290 (5th Cir. 1975) (applying Mississippi law); Edwards v. Western Auto Supply Co, 477 So. 2d 261,
264-65 (Miss. 1985) (assumption of risk mae that cited Sears with approval).
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TABLE S. Notes
SUt Note
Missouri Comparative fault applies to products liability claims. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.765(1) (Vernon 1990).
However, consideration of plaintiffs fault is limited to the "(I) [t]he failure to use the product as
reasonably anticipated by the manufacturer (2) [ubse of the product for a purpose not intended by the
manufacturer, (3) [ulse of the product with knowledge of a danger involved...; (4) [ubnreasonable
failure to appreciate the danger involved in use of the product...; (5) [the failure to undertake the
precautions a reasonably careful user of the product would take ... (and] (6) [t]he failure to mitigate
damages" Id. § 537.765(3).
Montana The conduct of a plaintiff who 'voluntarily and unreasonably exposes himself" to a knowa danger must be
compared with that of a defendant in strict liability cases. Znhrte v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 661 P.2d 17, 19
(Mont. 1983) (assumption of risk case which states that the defense is not merged with contributory
negligence for strict liability masa).
Nebraska Comparative negligence applies to actions based on strict liability in tort. NEEL REv. STAT. § 25-21,185
(1989).
Nevada Comparative negligence does not apply to strict liability. NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41.141(5)
(Michie Supp. 1991).
New Hampshire Comparative negligence statute does not apply to strict liability although principles of comparative
causation under the common law do apply to strict liability cases. Tibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
395 A.2d 843, 848 (N.H. 1978).
New Jersey Comparative negligence applies to strict products liability. Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co.,
406 A.2d 140 (NJ. 1979).
New Mexico Comparative negligence applies to products liability. Jaramillo v. Fisher Controls Co., 698 P.2d 887, 898
(N.M. Ct. App.), cert denied, 698 P.2d 887 (N.M. 1985).
New York Comparative negligence applies to products liability and strict liability except that it does not apply to the
equitable share of a manufacturer's liability when 'the manufacturer of the product is not a party to the
action' because of lack of jurisdiction and the claimant establishes that the liability 'would have been
imposed upon the manufacturer by reason of the doctrine of strict liability." N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L & I
1602(10) (McKinney Supp. 1992).
North Dakota Comparative negligence applies to 'strict liability for product defect, breach of warranty, negligence or
assumption of risk, misuse of a product for which the defeandant otherwise would be liable, and failure to
exercise reasonable care to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages.' N.D. CENT. CODE § 33-03.2-01
(Supp. 1991).
Ohio Comparative negligence does not apply to products liability except as an affirmative defense with respect
_ to suppliers. OHio REV. CoDE ANN. § 2315.20(c) (Anderson 1991).
Oklahoma Comparative negligence does not apply to strict liability. Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d
1353, 1365 (Okia. 1974).
Oregon Comparative negligence applies to strict products liability claims. Bacceileri v. Hyster Co., 597 P.2d 351
(Or. 1979) (en banc).
Pennsylvania 'ITMhe concept of strict liability as being devoid of notions of negligence, has remained intact in this
jurisdiction.' Staymates v. IT Holub Indus., 527 A.2d 140,143 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
Rhode Island Comparative negligence does not apply to strict products liability actions. Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 584
F.2d 1124, 1133-34 & n.11 (Ist Cir. 1978) (applying Rhode Island law), cert denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979).
South Carolina No data
South Dakota Comparative negligence does not apply to strict liability. Smith v. Smith, 278 N.W.2d 155 (S.D. 1979).
Texas Comparative fault applies to strict products liability. Damages can be recovered if claimant's share of
responsibility is less than 60%. TEx. Crv. PRA. & REV. CODE ANN. § 33.001(b) (West Supp. 1991).
Utah Comparative fault applies to 'strict liability, breach of express or implied warranty of a product, products
liability, and misuse, modification or abuse of a product.' UTAt. CODF. ANN. § 78-27-37(2) (1987).
Vermont Comparative faults applies to strict products liability claims. Smith v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 600
F. Supp. 1561, 1567-68 (D. VL 1985).
Washington Comparative fault includes strict tort liability, products liability, and breach of warranty. WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 4.22.015 (West 1988).
West Virginia Comparative negligence applies to products liability case King v. Kayak Mfg. Corp., 387 S.E.2d 511,514
(W. Va. 1989).
Wisconsin Comparative negligence applies to strict products liability cases. Austin v. Ford Motor Co., 273 N.W.2d
233,248-49 (Wis. 1979).
Wyoming Comparative negligence does not apply to strict products liability and warranty cases. Phillips v. Duro-
Last Roofing, Inc., 806 P.2d 834, 836-37 (Wyo. 1991).
Note: Unless otherwise indi ated. the type of eonT-tivo negl 'e on (ie.. pe. equal to or ts thn. less thnu)
ed fo pd slott lit. ty sod .t. iablty is the to syaem as is oed by the ote for zesietsee actio.
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